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I. Introduction
Without a doubt: The existence of a strong, united, capable and cooperative labor
movement was a substantial contribution to the post-1945 success story of the Federal
Republic in its rise from the destruction wrought by National Socialism and war to a
model of democratic and economic stability. Indeed, from the very outset in the
immediate postwar era, the labor movement was staunchly committed to the goal of
democratization. Its programmatic demands for a reconstruction of the economy
(Neuordnung der Wirtschaft) were formulated in the interest of promoting both
economic and social democracy. Subsequently, the realization of co-determination
became the permanent leitmotiv for the goal of participatory democratic rights for
employees. Politically, the trade unions mobilized time and again to warn against non-
democratic and anti-democratic developments. And in the context of constitutionally
guaranteed collective bargaining rights (Tarifautonomie), the trade unions2 have made
a substantial contribution to the development of the German Model of labor relations,
i.e. that comprehensive web of institutions and organizations regulating conflicts
between the interests of labor and capital3. The Model has been a source of stability
and growth in the Federal Republic, and in this capacity it has certainly been a key
enabling factor of Germany's democratization success story.
The economic and political successes of the German Model are indicative of the
strategic capacity of the unions to act (Handlungsfähigkeit). Organizationally, this
capacity has been defined by the encompassing and dominating importance of unity.
Concepts such as "united union federation", "one workplace - one union", "sectoral
instead of company contracts" or "comprehensive interest representation of all
employees by the works council" are representative of the importance attached to unity
as a measure of achieving solidarity.
Programmatically, the unions have understood the need to create and define goals for
themselves, for the general public, and for the opponent camp of employers as a social
and political project. In fulfilling their task as the organization of employee interest
representation, the unions have been able, in the words of Ilse Brusis, to rely "above
all on the collective action of their members, on the values and norms of solidarity in
interest representation, and on the strong backing within traditional working class
milieus."(Brusis 1990: 12) At the same time, the German unions have historically
oriented themselves toward being a broadly defined social and political movement in
the defense of justice.
Over the last decade, this normative depiction of German unions and the German
Model has grown out of focus with the reality. In their expertise of 1990 entitled
"Beyond the Status of Resolutions", academic observers sympathetic to the union
cause expressed their concern that in the face of new challenges resulting from
German unification, the unions were in danger of losing their strategic ability to act and
define the options of their politics. They saw the DGB "retreating into a purely
2 Our presentation deals solely with the German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerk-
schaftsbund - DGB) and its member unions, which are sectoral or multi-branch organizations. The
German Salaried Employees Union (Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft - DAG) has merged with
4 DGB-unions to found the new service sector union Ver.di within the DGB. Another major
employee organization, the Federation of German Civil Servants (Deutscher Beamtenbund - DBB)
does not have the capability to strike and its collective bargaining activities are very restricted.
3 The term German Model first came to mean what it does today in West Germany in the 1980s.
(Dufour, 1998; Müller-Jentsch, 1995)
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defensive position with the intent of protecting existing standards for its core
members."(Hoffmann/Hoffmann/Mückenberger/Lange 1990: 17) In the same year,
historians of the union movement met to discuss the consequences of German
unification for the unions, concluding that the unions were missing many opportunities
to define the issues and shape their strategy to meet new demands. "Indeed, it appears
to us that the unions are in need of recalling the basic values and convictions which
they have evolved over time."(Hans-Böckler-Kreis 1990: 589)
And today? Who are the trade unions? How do they define themselves on the
threshold to the 21st century? What are their goals, what are their topics and issues?
And what strategy will they pursue, whose interests will they defend, who are their
opponents? Have the German trade unions over the past decade lost their capacity to
find answers to such questions? What meaning does the concept of unity have today
and how do the trade unions conceptualize solidarity?
Over the past decade, a continuously high level of unemployment, globalizing financial
and product markets, new forms of employment and new demands on work (especially
in the service sector and network structures), and not the least of all massive
restructuring processes in the context of German and European unification have
undercut the overall economic and political context and weakened the specific
institutional structures of the German Model of labor relations.
The German unions have not been able to prevent this process from continuously
eroding their political and organizational foundation. Nor have they developed the kind
of input necessary to be able to substantially shape the changes in their environment
to the benefit of their constituencies. Although they can show some partial successes,
their activities have been overwhelmingly oriented toward defending the past, i.e. the
structures, institutions and positions which they have built upon and made viable since
the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949. Such a defensive strategy is
problematical in the context of the current flux of changes because it is exclusively
oriented toward the past and thus fails to generate new perspectives from old
strengths.
Today, the situation of the German unions has to be described as extremely
complicated and full of contradictions. Within the unions it is difficult to mark the
existence of clearly defined political positions and programs. In any case, the
ideological camps which set the tone of controversy between the various unions in the
past are hardly discernable in the political sphere of today's unions. The complexity of
new political and socio-economic demands is part of the explanation of this
phenomenon but certainly not the whole reason. Of equal importance is the fact that
the politics of German unions have become dominated by pragmatism. This may have
to do with the realism which has always characterized successful union policy. But a
policy based solely on realism and pragmatism lacks direction and strength. Union
policy needs vision as well to motivate and mobilize for its goals.
To be sure, the adherents of neo-liberalism have no use for visions of solidarity. But
the unions, as Richard Hyman has pointed out, are destined to fight the "battle over
ideas" and should never relinquish their visions or allow others to define them (Hyman
1999: 4). For unions, retaining and using political and economic power is at once
dependent on the strength which is rooted in a powerful organization and on a political
vision which extends beyond the demands of everyday politics. The culmination of this
power is then the ability to be able to integrate these two elements with each other. In
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other words: “Trade unions have always had two faces, sword of justice and vested
interest.” (Flanders, 1970:15. Quoted in Hyman 1999: 1).
How unions can regain the initiative in the struggle to realize their own goals and rebuff
the neo-liberal scenario is surely a question for which there are no easy answers or
patent prescriptions. Nevertheless, we regard the combination of an engaged and
realistic policy of interest representation with the formulation of an encompassing
programmatic vision as imaginable and possible.
Are the German unions showing signs of embarking along such a path? In part. The
problem today for the unions is not that they are not searching for answers to the
pressing problems they are facing. That is, for example, exactly what the IG Metall is
seeking to do with the campaign "Debate on the Future" which it recently launched4.
Likewise, the merger project Ver.di is conceived as a big step toward consolidating and
strengthening union representation in the rapidly growing service sector5. DGB
headquarters and all of the other unions in the federation also have their "revitalization
projects" which focus on a wide variety of union organization and politics.
As such, the problem lies elsewhere. It seems that the experiences which unions are
making with many of their innovative activities and special projects are not being
evaluated with respect to their applicability for the organization as a whole. This is a
weakness of the unions resulting from the fact that they are incapable of generalizing
the lessons of such projects, whether this be within a single union organization or from
one union to another. Equally detrimental for a union revitalization strategy is the fact
that the potential of the DGB as an umbrella organization to play an active role in
evaluating and spreading "best practices" at the regional and local level is not being
used.
But then, diversity and grass-roots politics were spurned in a union movement in which
unity was the exclusive principle of organization, historically justified and successful in
coping with a particular economic and political environment. Especially in Germany,
mass production capitalism as it grew in the post-World War II era brought forth a
highly centralized model of union representation: Union responsibility for the political
and sectoral arenas, works councils responsible for the workplace. Reform policies,
which are initiated and controlled from the top down within the unions are in danger of
overlooking and even ignoring initiatives and independent developments at the
regional and local levels of the organization. This can be especially the case when
such initiatives challenge the existing distribution of resources.
II. Arenas of Union Revitalization Strategies
The aims of this paper are twofold. First, we want to open an broad discussion of union
revitalization strategies in the German unions as they are contemporarily manifested in
the six areas of strategy which seem to be most significant:
• organizing the unorganized;
• mergers and internal restructuring;
• social partnership (from firm to industry to the national level);
4 See http://www.IG Metall.de/themen/zukunft/index.html
5 See http://www.verdi-net.de
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• political action;
• coalition building;
• cross-border trade union collaboration.
Secondly, we will present an assessment of current developments in each of these
areas with the aim of pointing to both selected, existing revitalization strategies and to
strategy deficits where new accents are lacking, but conceivable. Our paper will sum
up with a critical review.
1. Organizing the Unorganized
Despite encouraging signals such as the public announcement of the IG Metall to
spend 12 Million DM for membership organizing in 2001, organizing is still the
stepchild of German unions. In contrast to American or British unions which are
traditionally more dependent on their membership strength, German unions used to
rely mainly on their institutional resources (labour laws, industry level bargaining). In
addition, since German unions act mostly at the industry level, organizing is the
primary responsibility of the works council. However, the current transformation of the
German industrial relations system (e.g. Europeanization/globalization,
decentralization of collective bargaining) weakens the institutional power resources
and there is clearly the need for unions to re-emphasize their organizational resources.
Our fieldwork6 revealed that most unions have not yet succeeded in radically rethinking
their strategies of organizing. In most cases organizing is still reduced to classical
advertisement campaigns and public relations (image campaigns, posters). For
example, the DGB spent 4.2 million DM on an image campaign7 for the EXPO 2000 in
Hannover. There is also a DGB initiative to create a new image campaign for the
millennium which is aimed to last for two years (and designed by an internationally
acclaimed advertisement agency) and includes various topics on why unions are
necessary in the new millennium. The aim is to improve the old-fashioned image of
unions. As one DGB official (DGB workshop 1999) put it “in the 90s unions became to
be seen as ‘dinosaurs’ because they are not ‘innovators’ anymore but ‘conservators’ of
the vanishing industrial society. Employers on the other hand turned to become
innovators. During the 80s unions were publicly more present and supported in the
6 The empirical research is based on semi-structured interviews (in average 3 h) conducted with the
chief official of the recruitment/ advertisement/ public relations department of six German unions
(out of 12 unions) in summer 1999: HBV (banking, insurance, retailing), IGM (metal), IG BCE
(chemical, energy, mining), DPG (post/telecom/ postal banking), GEW (education, higher
education) and NGG (food processing, hotels and restaurants). The six unions were selected in
order to obtain a mixture of large and small unions (e.g. IGM - the largest union in Germany and
DPG - one of the smallest), a mixture of traditional industrial unions and service sector unions (e.g.
IGM vs HBV, GEW), a mixture between so-called more militant unions (IGM) and more moderate
unions (IG BCE), and a mixture of public sector (GEW) and private sector unions. This sample
should provide a representative picture of German unions.
Three unions (IGM, DPG, IG BCE) which had recent organizing campaigns were further selected as
intensive case studies (including the study of documentary material of each union). We also
participated at various workshops of the DGB on advertisement (“DGB Werbeausschuss”) which
included the chief advertisement officials of several DGB unions and the DAG (white-collar union).
7 This included billboards with a statement about the corporatist committee for the reform of the
welfare state and labour market (Bündnis für Arbeit). The message was “unions want to secure the
German apprenticeship system and want a fair distribution of work”. In detail this meant “a
guarantee of a apprenticeship for each young person entering the labour market, retirement from
60, more jobs instead of overtime, attractive part-time work”.
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famous 35h working time dispute. So far, unions did not manage to create a new
identifiable public topic in the succession of the 35h campaign.”
The perception of organizing as advertising was also evident from observing the
discussions of the DGB workshop “advertisement, communication and public relations”
which we attended regularly over a year. The participants of these workshops consist
of union officials responsible for advertising campaigns of individual DGB unions who
meet regularly to discuss union specific advertisement campaigns and to facilitate
learning among each other. The focus of their discussion is how to best publicize union
values and goals as a means to recruiting new members.
The fact that all unions have an advertisement/marketing department which is
responsible for membership organizing also indicates this particular view on
organizing. Moreover, union advertisement is conducted in a highly professional
manner. As the organizer of this DGB workshop explained “in former times our field
was called “membership recruitment” (Anwerbung), then “membership soliciting” and
now it is “advertisement, communication and public relations”. Communication is
defined as ‘information’ but also as ‘integration’ and ‘identification’ and is directed
towards members, officials, public, other unions and the non-organized. Unions
frequently employ advertisement agencies to develop advertisement and recruitment
campaigns, something which is not common in the US or British labor movement. The
aim is to sell the product “union” to the public and to potentially new members and to
establish an identifiable role of unions in the public debate. The current problematic
public image of unions is seen as a major hindrance for organizing.
One obvious reason for the emphasis on marketing and public relations of unions is
the fact that the political and public role of unions in Germany is traditionally much
stronger than in Anglo-Saxon countries. On the other hand it indicates that most
German unions still have a rather classic understanding of member organizing through
advertisement tools and are far away from an approach which radically redefines
organizing as a new relationship between members and union organization as it has
been developed in recent years in several US and British unions.
The argument of this new organizing approach is that classical advertisement is not
sufficient to organize non-members and to keep existing members in our modern,
“post-industrial” society. Members should not be treated as passive customers but
should be constantly involved in the union organization. Organizing has to be defined
as an encompassing concept which recruits new members and continuously activates
the existing ones. This requires a thorough organizational restructuring process. The
union organization needs to become more decentralized, the individual members need
to get more competences and responsibilities, there is a need to train professional
organizers, and a need to have more financial resources for organizing campaigns. In
addition, unions need to understand themselves less as service providers
(organizations which serve their members) and more as social movements which
encourage members to become active and identify with a common cause. Traditional
bread-and-butter issues should be combined with values of social justice and solidarity.
Members should feel that they belong not only to an interest organization which
bargains wages but also to a community which represents certain values. In the US
this is frequently interpreted as a stronger emphasis on union militancy.
The intention is to transform large union bureaucracies into more flexible organizations
with empowered union members who can solve certain problems on their own without
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approaching the union officials. This seems a promising strategy to respond to the new
management practices such as teamworking and decentralization.
As mentioned above, this US-style organizing model (Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998) has
not yet created much interest within the German labor movement. However, some
unions however have managed to implement new, innovative concepts of organizing.
The most prominent examples are the DPG (post/ telecom/ postal bank) and IG BCE
(chemical/ mining/ energy/ leather) (others such as the IG BAU or IG Metall have
innovative practices as well but these are not yet embedded into a coherent organizing
strategy). Both unions introduced for different reasons (privatisation in the case of
DPG, merger in the case of IG BCE) a comprehensive organizational reform which
included as a core strategy organizing. In the following we will provide a brief overview
of their innovative strategies.
a. DPG
The watershed for the DPG was 1992. The union lost more than 100.000 members
between 1992 and 2000 (546,906 to 445,390). This was mainly caused by the
tremendous changes in their industry. The DPG was a traditional, very powerful
“company union” in the public sector and acted as a closed shop. “If you became an
employee for the Deutsche Post you had to join the union” (quote head of
advertisement, March 99). The union had good relations to management and was
traditionally known for their social partnership approach.
Yet privatization and restructuring of various parts of the Deutsche Post (e.g. Deutsche
Postbank), the privatisation of the Deutsche Telekom and the entrance of private
companies and in particular of greenfield sites in the transportation and telecom sector
(UPS, mobile phone companies, etc.) meant job losses and the necessity for the DPG
to adapt to dramatically changing conditions in order to survive.
In 1993 the DPG introduced a comprehensive organizational reform program. For
example, the four original departments responsible for communication, advertisement,
public relations, in-house journals and recruitment were merged into two. The
department “membership journal, advertisement and publications” is now responsible
for organizing. The term ‘advertisement’ is preferred to ‘recruitment’. “It’s not an army
which recruits people but an organization which promotes itself.” (“geworben um sie zu
gewinnen” - quote head of advertisement, 03/99).
Moreover, in 1994 the executive committee decided to implement a comprehensive
reform to promote organizing throughout the entire organization. The main message
was “membership organizing is the job of everybody”. It is no surprise that this created
various forms of resistance among full-time officials which is still not entirely overcome.
The program goals included first of all the intension to communicate to all officials that
organizing is a top priority of the DPG. For example, no speech of the union president
is without a statement about the organizing efforts of the DPG. Second, it included an
image campaign (new logo, new information brochures for members) and new
advertisement materials to support new organizing methods at shop floor level. Third,
several organizing campaigns were developed to increase membership in core
companies and in greenfield sites. Fourth and most importantly, it included a thorough
structural reform of the union organization to support organizing. Each of the 17 union
districts were asked to designate one of their board members to supervise organizing,
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the appointment being for a minimum of 4 years). The head office helped by producing
a list with essential personal characteristics of organizers. “There is no financial
incentive to become an organizer, motivation is all what counts” (quote, head official
advertisement). They were responsible to get their local branches to select one
organizer who was then responsible for the workplace branches to select an organizer
themselves. This network of organizers at each level of the union hierarchy is
supposed to establish a firm ‘backbone’ for the union’s organizing efforts. All
organizers meet regularly and receive professional training in organizing.
There are five explicit aims of organizing at the DPG: (i) to keep members in the union
and to service them well, (ii) to recruit new employees and the youth, (iii) to recruit
employees who are not yet members, (iv) to keep retired members, (v) to prevent
members who want to leave the organization from it (DPG brochure June 98).
The emphasis is on systematic planning of the organizing initiative: analysis of
membership potential, realistic goal setting, continuing motivation and training of
organizers (to prevent fatigue and stress), and the monitoring and evaluation of
individual campaigns.
So far the union’s efforts seemed to have paid off. Although membership numbers are
still declining, the number of new entrances are increasing. Since 1994 each year
around 12.700 new members are recruited. This is more than the IGM achieves the
head of the advertisement dept. announced proudly. He knows that it will be difficult to
reach a positive membership balance within the next couple of years but in the long run
he thinks it is possible.
A new initiative started in 1999 (“Offensive 1999”) which has the declared aim to
double the annual number of new members compared to last year. This initiative
includes “members-recruiting-members” programs (financial incentives). It also
addresses the local organizers to initiate organizing campaigns and to compete with
other workplace in their recruitment success (financial incentives). The explicit aim is to
get the local organizers “to mobilise the entire workplace”. This includes the
development of organizer teams at local level which obtain professional training on
team work. So far the emphasis has been to train individual organizers, now the idea is
to get them to create teams which discuss individual organizing problems but also
develop campaigns together. They are supported with various literature and seminars
are hold to explain the concept. The initiative will be evaluated at the end of this year
with the help of a survey of the local branches.
In sum, the success rate of the past organizing efforts is relatively high and the head
officials are enthusiastic about this development. However, they acknowledge that
there is still a huge need to further enhance organizing. A recent DPG survey (1998)
revealed that only a third of local union officials thought of themselves as active
organizers. Yet, the DPG seems to be on the right way. They managed successfully to
make “organizing” a top priority and introduced structural reforms to support those
efforts.
b. IG BCE
The former chemical union (IG Chemie, Papier, Keramik) was aware of its membership
problems since the 1980s but German unification and its merger in 1997 with the
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mining (IG Bergbau und Energie) and leather (IG Leder) unions diverted attention from
this topic for a while.
Soon after the merger the new union started its first systematic organizing initiative
(“Offensive 2000”) which lasted for three years (until the end of 1999) and which was
accompanied by major organizational changes. The initiative was introduced by a
participative approach and thus was openly discussed throughout the organization
rather than just implemented from above. The structural reform comprised the creation
of three subdivisions of the department ‘organization and advertisement’ which are
responsible to organize campaigns locally. Group A is responsible for already
organized companies where the aim is to increase union density. There are two full-
time officials responsible for the campaigns and they get help from 10 additional
officials each week to implement the individual campaigns. All union officials of the
IG BCE are required to spend four weeks each year in organizing. Last year they
organized campaigns in 112 companies.
Group E is responsible for non-unionised companies. The group is lead by one full-
time official who works with officials of selected districts for three months to organize
campaigns in their area (the regional officials are required to spend their time in this
project). Last year they approached 139 companies and initiated 40 new works council
elections.
The third group “members recruit members”, has two full-time officials as trainers who
travel from workplace to workplace to train workplace activists in individual and
collective organizing.
There are various additional projects. For example, each shop steward
(Vertauensleute) receives a membership joining declaration each month from the
headquarters to remind him/her to recruit at least one new member each month.
Moreover, each district offical has to visit two companies each month and recruit
members (without goal setting). The results are sent to the district chief official and to
the head advertisement department.
At this stage the project is regarded as worth the effort despite the membership losses
during this period (the union comprised 1,010,555 members in 1997 and 922,783 in
1999). The three groups managed to recruit around 9000 new members each year.
The long-term aim is to consolidate the 1 million membership figure.
There are of course differences between the organizing models of both unions. A
difference to the DPG is that the organizing project of the IG BCE is more centrally
planned and controlled. For example, all union officials are forced to do ‘organizing’ for
an entire month each year. The DPG on the other hand pursues a slightly more
voluntaristic and decentralised approach and tries to empower their organizers at each
level to pursue organizing efforts. The DPG headquarters introduce new campaigns
which can be taken on board by the local branches but they are not forced to do so.
But what both unions have in common is a coherent, planned approach to organzing.
For sure all German unions have organizing campaigns but what distinguishes the two
unions from the rest is exactly the strategic approach to organizing. It is not just a
message of how important members are, it also includes a financial and organizational
investment in organizing.
The above description of the initiatives of both unions is further reinforced by a
representative survey of works councillors in both unions which Frege conducted in
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2000 (table 1).8 Although the works councillors of both unions mostly used traditional
organizing tools such as distributing advertisement materials, focusing on a successful
works council work and talking to non members at shopfloor level, they have positive
attitudes towards the importance of organzing. A large majority (72%) for example
disagrees that serving members is more important than organizing or that there are
more important problems than organizing for the works council. They are also
convinced that unions still have a major role to play in todays’ society (87%) and half of
the works councillors think that they can sell union successes to their workforce.
In short, these findings suggest that the two unions have successfully managed to
raise the awareness of their shopfloor activists, i.e. works councillors about the
importance of union organizing. This is particularly interesting with regard to the
current debate of the German union movement on works councillors’ assumed
tendency to become more independent from unions and more workplace focused (e.g.
Bosch et al. 1998).
Table 1:
Which organizing methods were used in your workplace last year? in %
yes no
special organizing team 28 72
benchmarking (figures how many new members
should be organized)
14 86
explicit effort to talk to non members at shopfloor level 83 17
planning who addresses which unorganized worker 46 54
distribution of advertisement material 74 26
union sponsored leisure activities for non members
and members
28 72
home visits by non members 03 97
financial incentives for members who recruit new members 39 62
practising good works council work 96 04
union advertisement on the black board 62 38
workplace organizing compaigns during
collective bargaining/ strikes
34 66
special information campaigns for potential new members of
special groups (women, youth, foreign workers)
29 71
8 The survey comprises 485 returned questionnaires with a return rate of 39%. The questionnaire
comprised 113 variables on workplace relations and works council - union relations. For more
information please contact Carola Frege.
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What do you think about the following statements? in %
strongly
disagree
disagree no view agree strongly
agree
Organizing campaigns are not worth their
money; you only get new members through
good works council work
07 42 12 33 06
There are more important problems at
this workplace than member organizing
16 42 09 30 04
Successes in member organzing are ultimately
not important for the bargaining strength of
the works council
19 44 04 29 05
Management intimidates potential members 33 48 07 09 02
Overall, employees do not need unions as
much anymore as in former times
50 37 04 08 02
Our union has an old-fashioned image 16 45 14 22 3
We cannot sell union successes anymore 07 46 09 34 05
Union officials of our union are not sufficiently
engaged in membership organizing
05 35 16 38 06
In the end it is more important to serve existing
members than to organize new members
14 60 11 13 02
There are three conclusions. First, our preliminary findings suggest that although there
is an increasing awareness of the importance of the issue and efforts among all unions
to improve their recruitment campaigns, an US style organizing model is not
widespread within the German labour movement. Only two unions, DPG and IG BCE,
out of twelve have properly implemented an “organizing approach”.
Second, the outlined organizing campaigns of the two unions reveal that typical “social
partnership” unions as are the DPG and IG BCE are capable to introduce an
organizing model which is similar to the US model, however without a militant,
mobilising ideology. This “paradox” might challenge the hypothesis of the US literature
that social partnership unions cannot adapt an organizing model.
Third, another difference between the organizing approach of the two German unions
and the US style model is that the former did not propagate a shift from servicing into
organizing. The German unions practice what can be called “managerial organizing” in
opposite to “grass roots organizing” or participative unionism as the US model
suggests. In other words, German unions’ relationship to their members continues to
be heavily focused on servicing. Members are to be attracted and retained by well-
designed and attractive services. Members are primarily seen as instrumental in their
orientation towards unions. In difference to Anglo-Saxon managerial unionism (see
Heery and Kelly 1994) collective interests are not displaced by a concern with
individual members’ interests. The attempt is rather to “sell” collective interests as
individual interests. Thus, organizing is seen as a strategy to advertise union’s services
rather than as substituting it (as the US model suggests).
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A final question is whether participative unionism is easily practicable in the German
context. We are sceptical. There were fierce debates in the German union movement
during the 1980s how to transform unions into participative or discourse organizations
(e.g. Zoll 1990). Today these debates have practically disappeared. One but clearly
not the only explanation might be that participative or social movement unionism is only
“affordable” in times of economic growth and basically directed towards a well paid,
educated and articulate middle-class segment of the union membership. German
political unification and its current economic restructuring (“globalisation”) have put
unions back to deal with simple bread and butter issues. Unemployment is clearly the
concern number one. Thus, maybe a social movement unionism is appropriate in an
US context with a growing economy and tight labour market supply but much more
difficult to introduce in the current German context.
To conclude, an US-style organizing model is not practiced in Germany. However there
are indicators that the two social partnership unions (DPG, IG BCE) are quite
successful with their newly established organizing approach. This provokes the
question to what extent a militant ideology and social movement unionism are really
necessary for a successful organizing model or whether this only applies to an Anglo-
Saxon setting. Our preliminary findings suggest the latter. To use Turner’s (1998:38)
words, “the high road of European style labour-management co-operation” might be as
equally successful as the US-style organizing activities which take the “low road of
grass-roots mobilization”.
2. Mergers and Internal Restructuring
Measures of internal union restructuring are far from being novel within the German
trade union federation, DGB. As for example Streeck pointed out in his seminal study
about labour’s organizational development in the post WW II era (Streeck 1981),
several unions turned to procedures of “administrative rationalisation” and sought to
mobilise additional resources. Such strategies in particular concerned the
organization’s dues revenue and included the formalisation of membership status.
Thus, several unions introduced computerised record keeping as well as direct deposit
as means to put the union on a more solid financial footing. While earlier practices
required union representatives to get in touch with each and every member just to
collect monthly contributions, automatic money transfer eliminated this necessity.
These earlier initiatives, however, almost exclusively focused on increasing the amount
of resources at the union’s disposal. In contrast we found more recent strategies to
focus on a much broader range of measures for restructuring and in particular to switch
from a strategy which seeks to extract even more resources from its membership, to a
more efficient use money, staff and voluntary work. Mostly initiated during the second
half of the 1990s unions pursued various forms of internal restructuring, ranging from
changing the organizations’ formal structure, to the introduction of more sophisticated
human resource management practices and to the implementation of comprehensive
and long-lasting programmes of “organizational development”. While throughout the
1990s, restructuring strategies based on the introduction of state-of the-art computer
technology were still widespread, unions in particular turned to “soft” strategies in part
even based on management practices (Müller 2001).
In several cases programmes for restructuring were introduced in the context of union
mergers. As will be shown later in this section, unions either had to adjust their
organizational structure just to enable the integration of a second union or used this
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window of opportunity to break resistance within the own organization and to introduce
structures which were on the agenda even prior to the merger.
Surprisingly, there was no union in our sample which did not restructure at all.
Although somewhat sheltered from market competition as well as protected from rapid
membership loss the Police Union (GdP) initiated internal restructuring as did the
Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union ÖTV. We also found incidents of internal
restructuring by industrial unions such as the construction workers (Industrie-
gewerkschaft Bauen, Agrar, Umwelt, IG BAU), the metal workers (IG Metall), and the
chemical and mineworkers (Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie, IG BCE)
which are strongly exposed to market competition.9 Although we could not find a
uniform pattern of restructuring there are several measures which appeared to be very
popular among several unions. Such measures included new techniques to spread
goals throughout the organization and to commit union bodies at all levels of the
organization to them. So called Zielvereinbarungen (target agreements), as kind of a
watered down version of management by objectives, were introduced by several state
level union bodies within the GdP, by the national miners and chemical workers union
and in part by the national headquarters of the construction workers. The general
philosophy behind Zielvereinbarungen is that organizations can be only successful
when goals are laid out in a transparent and clear fashion to provide all actors with
definite guidelines for their action. Goals are to be defined in negotiations between
actors at different stages of the hierarchy and can concern targets for outcomes, for
output, use of resources or efficiency. In practice, Zielvereinbarungen prove to be a
rather hybrid form of control. On the one hand, they are different from simple orders
because they are based on negotiations, on the other hand they are not egalitarian
because of the uneven distribution of power between the parties involved. In addition,
there are usually no serious sanctions for non-compliance because the concept target
agreements are based on two assumptions, first, that actors strive to provide good
work and second, that they are goal oriented.
In practice, such goals concern different aspects of unionism. In 1998 and as part of a
comprehensive programme for organizational development10 the chemical and
mineworkers started to experiment with Zielvereinbarungen. The union negotiated
targets for dues revenue and membership development but also considered criteria like
union’s success at elections for works councils and supervisory boards.11 In the case of
the Police Union such agreements had been negotiated between state-level union
bodies and locals and concerned primarily issues of membership activation and
participation12 while the construction workers are considering using Zielvereinbarungen
as a tool to improve organizing activities by local unions.13 Because the definition of
some of those targets is still causing the unions headaches there is a growing debate
about controlling. According to a statement by the director of the union owned legal
service corporation:
9 While the German metal and chemical industries are traditionally operating on international product
markets, the construction workers union is strongly affected by labour mobility and in particular by
the influx of foreign labour.
10 The programme was titled „GEO, Gemeinsame Entwicklung der Organization“.
11 Interview IG BCE, 11.28.2000
12 Interview GdP, 12.08.1999
13 Interview IG BAU, 12.09.1999
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“In a truly efficient steering system controlling is supporting political leadership within
the organization, is leading to more transparency inside the union, to the
professionalisation of economic leadership as well as to cost reduction and to the
concentration on the most important tasks while also being able to better serve the
needs of membership.” (Westermann, 1998, p. 313)
Most unions, however, are still in the beginning of more comprehensive restructuring
and still a far cry from Westermann’s vision. But recent efforts should not be
underestimated. It is notable that certain measures of restructuring seem to spread
even beyond class boundaries.
In addition to initiatives which seek to improve union governance some unions also
turned to more sophisticated human resource management practices. While measures
to improve union government structures through means of target agreements and
controlling seek to pursue a strategy of more coherent union policies, human resource
management strategies first made their way into the union as a means to consolidate
union budgets and in particular to keep personnel costs under control. The ÖTV was
among the first unions to introduce a official policy on this matter. At its extraordinary
congress in 1994, a majority of delegates passed a regulation which prohibits the
organization to spend more than 45 percent of its budget for payroll. Once this key
parameter was defined, the ÖTV, as well as other unions, faced the difficult task to
adjust its staff to declining membership levels as well as dues revenue without even
firing union employees.14
While the public sector and transport workers as well as other unions predominantly
used job turnover and generous early retirement plans to adjust their payroll to
declining financial resources, they later increasingly emphasised human resource
development as a means to use the full potential of its staff. At a more general level
this type of internal restructuring leads to revised mission statements which require
unions to treat their members as quasi customers rather than as passive owners.15 For
a while it seemed to be that “customer-orientation” remained in the state of lip-service
but in the second half of the 1990s an increasing number of unions took important
steps to follow up on this concept. In paraphrasing the proponents’ language: To treat
members as customers unions first need to know what customers want and second,
need to enable service representatives to deliver exactly these goods. In this sense,
“customer orientation” was not just a tool for raising membership commitment and
satisfaction but, even more important, it could also contribute to make the union more
appealing for those employees who are not yet members of the organization (see
section 1, organizing the unorganized).
14 There is an unspoken and unwritten law within the German union movement, that labour shall treat
its employees better than its counterparts within the corporate world. While unions occasionally
dismiss staff for misconduct, the rule precludes them to fire union representatives and clerical staff
for economic reasons. There was, however, a notable exception of this rule when the Banking and
Retail Union HBV faced such a severe budged crisis that it was forced to dismiss several union
representatives in its East German offices.
15 Right from the beginning this „customer-orientation“ view sparked conflict within the organization.
Strong forces within the labour movement maintained that unions are still substantially different
from a mere service agency or, to take a frequently used point of reference, from the ADAC, the
leading German automobile club. In contrast, reformers insisted that „customer orientation“ would
better fit members‘ needs and also make the union organization more accessible for the rank and
file. (See Simon 1997).
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In particular measures to survey the membership were widespread within the German
union movement. To take only a few examples, the metalworkers asked the POLIS-
Institute16 to survey its membership. The institute found that 84 percent of its West
German and 76 percent of its East German members were satisfied with the unions
core services such as collective bargaining, legal support and political interest
representation but there was also substantial criticism which in particular concerned
the organization’s lack of flexibility. The Police Union surveyed its membership twice.
In the first survey the GdP commissioned the Institut für empirische Forschung to find
out about how members value their own organization. A more recent survey conducted
by Zimbel und Partner (Heidelberg) analyses why former members have left the union.
Similar membership surveys were conducted by the construction workers17 while the
chemical workers commissioned the Frauenhofer Institute to measure the accessibility
of the union office for the membership.18
While opinion polls and membership surveys are frequently used instruments in the
unions’ toolbox a few organizations have taken the following step and turned to a more
professional management of human resources. Increasingly unions realise that full-
time union representatives are a driving factor for the organization’s success. Although
union activists in works councils, union workplace representatives (Vertrauensleute)
and a limited number of activists are important to keep the union running it is in the
responsibility of local union representatives to connect the different fields of union
activity. Thus paid union representatives are crucial to the union organization because
they strike a balance between the interests of works councillors and the union locals. In
addition, they provide important membership services such as legal counselling, and
are crucial to maintain close ties to political actors as well as to social movements.
In particular the construction workers union IG BAU, but to a smaller degree also the
IG BCE and the IG Metall recently turned their attention to improve the performance of
those paid representatives. While plans to introduce performance based pay structures
are still in the state of preliminary considerations19 all three organizations increased
their efforts to improve hiring procedures and training of union staff. In particular the
IG BAU raised the standards for union representatives. While during the 1960s and
1970s a majority of union officials came from the ranks of the work force and received
only a limited amount of training, newly hired representatives are now required to
graduate from a demanding 23 month training programme. This programme contains a
11 month quasi-academic education, one year on-the-job training in a local specialised
on training, and trainees need to pass a national examination administered by the
union’s headquarters. To raise the level of qualification within the ranks of the union’s
staff, the IG BAU introduced a generous early retirement plan and replaced part of the
retiring generation of union officials by representatives trained according to the new
standards.
All these initiatives, be it the introduction of human resource management or target
agreements, were implemented by the national union headquarters or by state level
union bodies but rarely actively involved union locals or union activists at the local
16
„Gesellschaft für Politik und Sozialforschung“
17 By the Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungsgruppe (SALSS) in 1993 (IG BSE 1995).
18 Interview IG BCE, 11.28.2000
19 Plans for performance based pay have been presented by the union federation DGB. Behind the
screens, the construction workers as well as the DGB owned legal service corporation (DGB
Rechtschutz GmbH) are considering to introduce new pay structures for union staff.
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level. Some unions, however, discovered that just by doing restructuring top-down, the
organization is in danger of ignoring existing potential at other parts of the union
organization. Thus, several unions set up more comprehensive programmes for
organizational development (Organizationsentwicklung, OE) which frequently seek to
involve local and regional union bodies and in several cases even bring outside
consultants into the union organization. Despite substantial differences such OE
projects are usually long term oriented, they target units from all parts of the
organization, and seek to encourage active participation.
Probably the most ambitious programme was the “Projekt OrganizationsEntwicklung”
by the metal workers union which started in November 1993 and lasted for almost six
years. In terms of subjects for union restructuring and development the project covered
a lot of ground. It included, among others, rather technical issues such as the
distribution of competencies between different units with the organization but also
visionary themes such as future fields of union activity. In total 8 areas for restructuring
were defined and union locals as well as regional districts were invited to submit
applications for co-funding by the national union. A special committee, comprised of
IG Metall officials from the headquarters, representatives from all of the 7 districts and
some selected locals, evaluate the project and visit the local to check if the proposed
project is realistic and sound. Besides this aspect of quality control the steering
committee would also make sure that a full range of topics for restructuring are covered
and would also help union bodies to implement and improve their programmes. In total
the union funded some 70 local, 8 multi-level and 5 district-level projects.
In 1997 and at a much smaller scale the IG BCE initiated its so called GEO Projekt
which is supposed to initiate a long-term modernisation process within the union and
which first included 10 different project teams. In March 1998 the construction workers
followed the lead. The IG BAU created a special department for organizational
development within the national headquarters and commissioned a national steering
committee to initiate a number of different projects. Such projects sought to improve the
quality of union services as well as to enable the organization to use financial and
personnel resources more efficiently. Once staff is freed from old responsibilities as an
effect of organizational improvements, the union now puts these resources to a
different use. Besides upgrading the range of membership services the organization
also seeks to extend its organizing activities. This is crucial for the IG BAU given that
the recent crisis in the construction industry not only reduces the union’s membership
in line with the total workforce, but also absorbs substantial personnel resources for
legal services20. Without comprehensive organizational restructuring, many of our
interviewees feared, the union would change its focus of activity from the construction
site to the court room.
While the IG BAU maintained a balance between national leadership and guidance
and local involvement, an earlier project by the public sector union ÖTV designed the
process of restructuring much more top down. At their national union convention in
1988 the ÖTV set up the campaign for organizational reform titled Zukunft des
20 As part of their membership with the union, employees are entitled to legal representation and
advice. While under normal circumstances the workload in legal counselling can be handled quite
well by the union office, the caseload tends to expand enormously under the condition of economic
downturns. First of all the crisis leads to an increase in dismissals, which boosts the number of
„dismissal protection cases“. Second, cut throat competition is being intensified which leads many
contractors to break the standards of the collective agreement by pressuring individual workers to
accept wages, benefits, and working time arrangements below the collectively agreed standard.
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öffentlichen Dienstes (ZöD) which was later, in 1994 amended by a more participatory
component (Frey, 1998). In contrast to the OE programmes of the IG Metall and the
IG BCE, the ÖTV approach was initially much more focused on the need to consolidate
the budget and to streamline its operations. Thus, it could be hardly surprising that by
1994 the outcomes of organizational reform had lead to a revision of the ÖTV’s formal
structure. Budget guideline had been introduced, the union had shrunk the size of
executive boards and committees. In addition the number of separate occupational
departments had been cut from 40 to 6.
But savings programmes are not the privilege of public sector unionism. In part caused
by membership decline, many unions found themselves in a situation where
organizational restructuring seemed to be inevitable just to keep the union running. In
several cases it is difficult to judge whether a certain measure of restructuring is just
the result of unions’ re-action to budget constraints or rather an attempt to pro-actively
develop their own organization.21 However, in all cases under review internal
restructuring occurred to be more than just a technical adjustment because it always
affected vital interests of actors within the union. Beyond the aspect of saving money
or developing organizational structures reform is also political because it frequently
changes the distribution of resources and power within the union. For example, when
the construction workers planned to use their personnel resources in a more flexible
manner by way of allowing the union’s headquarters to transfer paid union
representatives between locals this sparked substantial conflict within the organization.
Because hiring and work assignments were for a long time considered to be the
prerogative of each local, parts of the local leadership considered this proposal for a
revision of the IG BAU’s constitution to be a challenge for their power as well as for
local union autonomy. It took the union substantial effort to change the rules for
resource allocation and finally the constitutional amendment was passed by a narrow
margin only.
In several cases union mergers provided an opportunity for internal restructuring and
even accelerated the decision taking process22. As our research indicates, however,
there is no standard pattern of union merger and the final outcomes in terms of internal
restructuring strongly depend on the key characteristic of the union involved as well as
on the power relations between them. As table 2 indicates, merger activity is largely a
more recent phenomenon. While the number of independent affiliates of the German
Trade Union Federation DGB remained stable at 17 for most of the post WWII period,
this time of stability was followed by massive merger activity which brought the number
of affiliates down to 8.
21 The most clear cut case of re-active adjustment is probably the restructuring of the German Trade
Union Federation DGB, which almost completely depends on financial contributions by its member
unions. As a consequence of membership loss and declining dues revenue the DGB had to merge
large numbers of local offices and also cut the staff of its research institute to half.
22 According to Müller (2001, p. 110) union mergers are just tools which help unions to by time for
restructuring.
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Table 2: Union Mergers 1950-2001
Union Merged with New Name Membership
(as of 2000)
Year of
Merger
IG Druck und Papier Gewerkschaft Kunst IG Medien 175,044 1989
IG Bau-Steine-Erden
(IG BSE)
Gewerkschaft Gartenbau,
Landwirtschaft, Forsten
IG Bauen, Agrar,
Umwelt
(IG BAU)
539,744 1995
IG Chemie, Papier,
Keramik (IG CPK)
IG Bergbau und Energie
Gewerkschaft Leder
IG Bergbau,
Chemie, Energie
(IG BCE)
891,587 1997
IG Metall Gewerkschaft Textil- und
Bekleidung (GTB)
IG Metall 2,630,620* 1999
IG Metall Gewerkschaft Holz und
Kunststoff
IG Metall 2,763,485 2000
Gewerkschaft
Öffentliche Dienste,
Transport und
Verkehr (ÖTV)
IG Medien
Deutsche Postgewerkschaft
(DPG)
Gewerkschaft Handel,
Banken, Versicherungen
(HBV)
Deutsche
Angestelltengewerkschaft
(DAG)
Vereinigte
Dienstleistungs-
gewerkschaft
(ver.di)
2,888,482** 2001
*Excluding the membership of the Gewerkschaft Holz und Kunststoff
** As of March 2001
But when merger is labour’s answer to a problem, what actually is the problem? In a
number of cases mergers were considered to be the appropriate answer to
membership decline23. During the time of low merger activity DGB affiliates faced a split
development of membership. While in absolute numbers unions gained strength
because membership increased from 5.450 million (1950) to 7.938 million (1990),
relative strength was constantly on decline and unionisation rates came down from
35.7 (1950) to 29.0 (1990). Only when, in the aftermath of the German unification,
absolute membership too started to dip, the process of union mergers picked up speed.
In particular smaller unions such as the artists union (29,613 members in 1988) leather
workers (21,929 members in 1996), the garden and forestry workers (82,725 members
in 1995) but also the timber and plastics workers (132,865 members in 1999) and the
textile workers (183,349 members in 1997) faced increasing problems to maintain
union offices in all regions of the country and to provide basic services for its
membership. While the financial situation of those smaller unions was very
heterogeneous24, all unions expected that it would be for the benefit of its members to
be part of a larger and potentially more powerful organization. From the perspective of
the larger “host” union, a unified and larger union could benefit from administrative
23 According to Streeck and Visser (1998) union officials pay little regard to sector and politics but are
driven by the search for „organizational viability“.
24 The leather workers were considered to be rather wealthy while in particular the textile workers and
the timber and wood workers faced severe budget constraints.
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economies of scale and also increase its power relative to the employers as well as
within the DGB. A similar rationale could be attributed to the merger between the
chemical workers union (IG CPK) and the mineworkers (IG Bergbau und Energie).
Although at time of the merger the mineworkers were comparatively strong25 and
wealthy, the union could expect to continue loosing members because the German
mining industry is scheduled to reduce the number and work force of the coal mines it
operates. Thus, the mineworkers acted proactively but did so in the expectation of
ongoing decline.
But even in the case of quasi take-overs of a small and weakened union by a
comparatively large and powerful organization we frequently found negotiated forms of
the integration and all kinds of unintended side-effects. For example the entire process
to merge the chemical workers union with the mine workers and the leather union took
four years to prepare and in several areas it was not clear who was calling the shots.
The entire process was accompanied and supervised by an external union-friendly
research institute (Martens, 1998, Martens and Klatt, 1994) and started with a non-
binding “cooperation agreement” which allowed participating unions to withdraw from
the project at any time if they disagree with the results of negotiations. Finally all three
unions decided to dissolve their old organizations and allowed each and every member
to revoke the transfer of their membership status to the new IG BCE.26 In other cases,
such as the merger between the gardeners union GGLF and the construction workers
members were transferred automatically.
In both cases, successor organizations inherited more than just members. The IG BCE,
for example, was faced with an almost ancient tradition of the mineworkers who do not
exclusively service and involve their members at the company level but maintain a
strong community based structure at the level of workers living quarters. The new
union discovered that in times of increasing worker mobility and fading ability of unions
to reach their members at the shop-floor such a structure increases labours’ ability to
stay in touch with a rising share of the union’s membership. The construction workers
made a different experience. While the organization was for decades dominated by
male workers, all of a sudden the merger with the GGLF brought large numbers of
women into the organization27 and – at least at the level of the union hall – forced the
union to reconsider part of its culture.28
In contrast to these mergers among non-equals, in predominantly motivated by
membership decline, the most recent merger among five public sector unions took
place in a much different context and thus represents a second type of merger activity.
According to a mission statement by the participating unions, Vereinigte
Dinestleistungsgewerkschaft (ver.di) was first initiated as an answer to technical,
economic and social change within the economy, state and society
(Gründungsorganization Ver.di 2000). In particular, the union seeks to end
jurisdictional disputes within the growing service economy and thus make labour a
stronger actor at the bargaining table. Whereas prior to the foundation of ver.di, three
25 In 1996 the IG Bergbau und Energie still had 335,317 members which were mostly concentrated in
the few German mining regions. In addition, the union could also benefit from extensive
codetermination rights in the coal, iron and steel industry.
26 Interview IG BCE 28.11.2000
27 In 1995 28.3% of GGLF members were women; in contrast, the construction workers union IG BSE
had only 9.7% female workers in their ranks. (Müller-Jentsch/Ittermann, 2000, tables C 30, C 32)
28 Interview IG BAU 06.30.1997
- 21 -
different unions organized employees in banking, ver.di will now have exclusive
jurisdiction. Particularly important is the participation of the Deutsche
Angestelltengewerkschaft (DAG) in the new union because the DAG for decades was
standing outside the German Trade Union Federation DGB and thus considered to be
a competitor for service sector unions such as the ÖTV and HBV but also for the metal
workers union.29 Besides this important aspect of reducing inter-union competition the
participating unions also plan to benefit from economies of scale by pooling their
resources. Below the level of more general goals the ver.di case also shows the
difficulties union face to create a new organization with is both, efficient and legitimate
(Keller, 1999, p. 622). To provide equal representation for all occupations represented
by ver.di, participating unions decided on the introduction of a “matrix structure”. In this
matrix, workers’ interests will be represented by 13 different branch level units, which
are covering more than 1,000 different occupations in some 30 industries. In addition,
the new union also maintains a hierarchical structure composed of local unions,
regional/state level union bodies and the national headquarters. In particular the
smaller participants in the merger insisted that all 13 branch level units are to be
represented by full time union officials at all three hierarchical levels within the
organization. While such a matrix structure is considered to support the active
integration of participating actors as well as to improve equality there is also the
danger of unclear responsibilities, high transaction costs and conflict. Thus, it can be
hardly surprising that companies only rarely decide in favour of the introduction of a
matrix structure. In the case of ver.di, the matrix was appealing to participating unions
because it promised a rather clear-cut, technical solution to a political problem. In
particular the small unions feared to be disenfranchised by the large and powerful ÖTV
and thus insisted in this kind of guarantee to save their identity.
While it is still to early to predict how the unique experiment with the ver.di merger
might end, it seems to be fair to argue that the entire process of creating the worlds
largest single union is a product of the unions’ tremendous courage to take a high risk
as well as their rather eclectic way to design the new organization. While labour’s
experience with both internal restructuring as well as union mergers is rather recent
and limited, there is only slowly a set of routines emerging which helps unions to select
promising strategies for restructuring.
3. Social Partnership
For a long time industry wide patterned collective bargaining has been considered to
be the backbone of German industrial relations. At the national or regional level strong
and centralised unions and comprehensive employers associations negotiated
collective agreements and thus removed potential sources of conflict from company
level management and works councils. From this perspective it was the strength and
unity of key actors along with the limited exercise of militancy which provided the basis
for social partnership. During the last decade, however, there have been growing
concerns that this so called “dual system” is being eroded and certainly facing
demands for restructuring (see for example Thelen 2000; Hassel, 1999; Jacoby,
2000). Although it is not all clear what exactly the new system will look like, we can find
29 Unions affiliated with the DGB usually organize along branch boundaries and also obey to the
concept of „one company one union“. The DAG, in contrast, organizes exclusively white collar
workers but was doing so in all sectors of the German economy. These two competing concepts of
unionism caused substantial strain within the labour movement.
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some important signs that organized labour is facing an uphill battle in the field of
collective bargaining. In general, there are three major areas for concern. First, there is
a growing number of companies who chose not to join an employers association and
thus to be covered by an industry wide collective agreement. As tables 3 and 4
indicate, in 1999 52 % of companies in the West and 72 % of the companies in East
Germany have chosen to do without industry wide agreements. However, those West
German companies who live by the standards set by industry wide bargaining are still
employing the majority of the workforce.
Table 3. Collective Bargaining Coverage in West Germany
Companies (1997) Employees (1997) Companies (1999) Employees (1999)
Industry wide
agreements
49 % 65 % 44 % 65 %
Company
agreements
9 % N/A. 3 % 8 %
Without collective
agreements
42 % N/A. 52 % 27 %
Source: IAB Betriebspanel
The situation in the East looks comparatively worse (see table 4). But before ringing
the alarm bell we should also take into consideration that although not legally covered
by those industry level agreements, a substantial number of companies without
collective agreements are using wages and hours as determined by the industry
agreement as a point of reference.
Table 4: Collective Bargaining Coverage in East Germany
Companies (1997) Employees (1997) Companies (1999) Employees (1999)
Industry wide
agreements
26 % 44 % 21 % 46 %
Company level
agreements
14 % N/A. 5 % 11 %
Without collective
agreements
60 % N/A. 74 % 43 %
Source: IAB Betriebspanel
A second challenge to social partnership concerns so called opening or hardship
clauses. Faced by substantial pressures to adjust one-size-fits-all standards for wages
and working times to diverging conditions at the company level almost all German
unions negotiated clauses into their industry wide agreement which allow for limited
deviations. According to the WSI Works Council Survey (Bispinck, 2001; Dorsch-
Schweizer/Schulten, 2001), 22 % of all works councils reported the use of opening
clauses at the company level. Most frequently, works councils or unions agreed to the
extension or reduction of working time, lower entry-level wages or the reduction of the
annual bonus. Finally, there is a growing number of cases where individual employers
lower pay or change working time in violation of collective agreement. According to the
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WSI-survey, 15 percent of all works councils reported that establishments sometimes
or frequently violate collective agreements. Given that this survey is based on self-
reported data by the works councils, the actual numbers might be even higher.
a. Differences between Industries
Within this more general picture, we can find significant differences among those
sectors, which are strongly exposed to international market competition. Examples are
to be found in the following. Collective bargaining in the metal industry traditionally
takes place at the regional level but agreements are usually quite uniform throughout
the country. Part of the reason for this homogeneous structure of bargaining outcomes
is the union itself which, after having lost a bitter strike in 1954, had transferred the
authority for collective bargaining to the national union headquarters. Although the
IG Metall still negotiates pattern agreements which cover a large share of the union’s
jurisdiction it increasingly allows single companies to deviate from the terms and
conditions of regional agreements. Although the union did not formally agree to an
opening clause, it included a declaration into the industry wide agreements which
signals flexibility to employers.30 Because such deviant terms and conditions were
usually negotiated at the level of the IG Metall’s district union bodies, this new practice
signalled a remarkable decentralisation of labour’s bargaining power31. In contrast,
collective bargaining in the chemical industry remained largely focused on national
level social partnership. Although the IG BCE agreed to various opening clauses which
allowed for firm level exceptions from the national agreement, the union did not permit
subordinate union bodies to grant more favourable conditions to single companies.
National level social partnership between the chemical workers union and the BAVC,
the highly centralised national employers association, remained largely intact and so
far the adjustment of key terms and conditions of the national agreement to changing
business environment had gone smoothly.32 Finally, the construction workers are
operating within the most unfortunate bargaining environment because they are faced
with the massive influx of foreign labour, the deregulation of labour friendly laws in the
field of bad-weather allowances, and a growing number of contractors who are
violating collective agreements. In a situation were the two peak level employers
associations for the construction industry, HDB and ZDB, lost their power to commit
even many of their own members to the standards set by the industry wide
agreement33, the IG BAU was looking for alternative strategies to define and enforce
minimum standards and turned to the state for help. With its massive lobbying for kind
30 So called „Erklärungen zum Tarifvertrag“ usually provide that „the parties to the agreement will
continue the prevailing practice and strive to find special solutions that help companies prevent
bankruptcy and thus will contribute to saving companies as well as jobs.“
31 Interview IG Metall, Frankfurt May 1999; Interview Gesamtmetall Hanover, March 1999 and
Cologne, June 1999
32 Interview, Hanover, March 1999; Interview, Hanover, March 1999 #2
33 It should be noted that both associations pursue slightly different strategies. While the
Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie (HDB) preferable organizes larger companies, in
particular general contractors, the Zentralverband der Bauindustrie (ZDB), represents preferably
small and medium sized firms. Member companies of the HDB often find it easier to obey
collectively agreed standards because they are able to shift parts of the costs of high-wages and
decent working conditions to subcontractors. In contrast, ZDB’s small firm members face direct cut-
throat competition from those foreign contractors, who are able to employ low wage labour and thus
often find it difficult to pay the going rate as set by the industry wide agreement.
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of a national minimum wage, which is based on the European level Posted Workers
Directive, the union sought to introduce a new and comparatively lower bottom line34.
Thus, social partners in the construction industry not only faced a shift in the level at
which bargaining took place, but increasingly, they simply lost much of their power to
collectively determine wages, hours and working conditions.
In several respects collective bargaining is facing severe pressures for
decentralisation. First, decentralisation occurs against the law by way of breaking the
minimum standards of the industry wide agreement. Second, deliberate
decentralisation was introduced by clauses within industry wide agreements, which
empower works councils and management to flexibly set standards at the company
level. Finally, there also emerged decentralisation of structures and institutions of
collective bargaining which affect the level at which collective agreements are being
negotiated. Again, the extent and direction of change is different between industries.
While in the metal industry the union and single employers are shifting part of the
bargaining powers to the district level, the construction workers union has little control
over the process of decentralisation. In the metal industry, this process of unbalanced
decentralisation threatens to weaken social partnership because national and regional
employers are being partially cut out of the picture. While collective bargaining
structures in the chemical industry seems to be rather unchanged, the construction
workers union IG BAU seeks to replace weakened national employers associations by
the state, who seems to be a more powerful actor. As far as strategies for union
revitalisation are concerned, there seems to be little unions can do to maintain peak
level social partnership. As long as employers associations are not able to commit all
their members to standards set by industry wide collective bargaining there is always a
pressure towards decentralisation. At least in theory, unions could shift their focus from
the industry to the company level and thus put pressure on those employers who chose
to stand at the sidelines. In a limited number of cases unions actually have pursued
such a strategy35 but firm level pressure tactics in general prove to be rather costly and
in addition potentially change the fragile balance between works councils and industry
wide unions.
A second union strategy, however, seeks to adjust the content of collective
agreements to the changing needs of workers and companies. Such agreements target
new groups of workers who previously did not stand in the centre of the union’s
attention. In addition, they also include new subjects of bargaining which gained
importance either because of economic restructuring and the changing needs of
companies which came along with it or because union seek to compensate workers for
new risks not covered by the welfare state. Most of these new and innovative
agreements were first negotiated at the company level and it still needs to be seen
whether these provisions can be spread throughout the industry or not. As far as
Volkswagen is concerned, a case we will come back to later, there occurred several
34 This minimum wage within the construction industry was originally intended to limit wage
competition by requiring domestic and foreign contractors to pay their workers minimum wages for
the time they are working on German construction sites. Even if work contracts of those foreign
workers or collective agreements in their home countries provide for lower standards the „jus loci
laboris“ entitles them to German minimum wages. Despite the original intention of the law to lift
wages of posted workers the law also provides a wage floor for German workers. According to own
calculations by the IG BAU in particular workers in East Germany do not make more than minimum
wage.
35 Probably the most impressive case occurred in the construction industry where the IG BAU sought
to bring rebellious companies back into the national employers association.
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incidents in the recent past where union and company level management included new
and innovative provisions into the firm level agreement which later were extended to
the entire industry. In this sense, Volkswagen is something like a laboratory for industry
wide collective bargaining in the metal industry. But there are other laboratories as
well.
b. debis
Debis, the service subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler, operates within a business
environment which is completely different from Daimler’s blue collar culture. Most of
debis employees are high skilled and are used to representing their interests on their
own. Consequently, most of them never came in contact with the IG Metall before the
union initiated the election of a general works council in 1990. The union, however, still
had to learn how to develop a collective agreement which fits the needs of this special
group of employees. In the traditional blue collar sectors it was the union’s job to
provide decent working conditions and job security at a given workplace. In the case of
debis it had to provide an institutional framework which encourages employees to be
flexible and to take personal risk. Finally, in 1998 IG Metall and the company’s
management agreed on an additional collective bargaining agreement. Legally
considered to be a side letter to the industry wide agreement for the metal industry, the
new Ergänzungstarifvertrag provided for special regulations in the fields of pay,
working time and training. The new wage scale is based on two major elements. First,
debis employees receive a fixed monthly pay which accounts for approx. 85 percent of
their annual income. The remaining 15 percent are a composite determined by
individual performance and company profit. In the field of working time regulation the
union sought to find a compromise between employees’ desire to fit working times to
their personal needs and the company’s need for more flexibility. Finally, the parties
agreed on a schedule which allows the weekly working time to vary.
Depending on factors such as age, shift work, individual entitlements individual working
time now varies between 35 and 40 hours. To increase the level of flexibility the new
collective agreement now allows for working time accounts. Employees negotiate
targets with their superiors individually and are free to collect up to 550 hours of
overtime (within a time period of not more than 5 years) in their working time accounts.
Later, they can cash in these hours for purposes of training, sabbaticals but they are
also entitled to transfer their time credit to a lifetime working time account. In general,
this model allows employees to choose freely between several options. The new
agreement also provides for a range of measures in the field of training. Once a year
every employee meets his or her superior to talk about further qualifications. If both
agree that a certain training is desirable debis pays for the tuition and related
expenses. Training is usually conducted during working time and debis still keeps
paying for at least 50 percent of the time off during the training.
Most of these provisions recognise the special conditions within the high tech and
service industries and in addition give employees much leeway to shape their own
working conditions. While management was mostly happy with this new agreement
(Donay, 1998) there was also some resistance within the ranks of the metal workers
union. Some union officials feared that shifting autonomy back to the employees would
make them vulnerable to pressure by the company’s management (Drinkuth, 1999).
While the new innovative agreement made the union more appealing to the workforce
and helped to grow union membership, there are also reports about difficulties in
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applying the agreement. In particular line management only reluctantly negotiates
individual working time accounts and training plans but plant management and the
local union are optimistic to improve this situation.36
c. Volkswagen: Time is Money
Taking force in January 1998, VW’s management and works council agreed on a works
agreement which offers VW employees multiple ways to flexibly convert part of their
income, bonuses, overtime pay, vacation time and other entitlements into so called
„time assets“ (Zeitwerte). Such time assets can later be converted into time off for
purpose of early retirement or into additional retirement benefits. Because time assets
are taxable at the time of retirement and in addition freed from mandatory contributions
to the social insurance system, they provide employees with an attractive investment
opportunity. In the first two years of the time assets-agreement, workers already had
invested time and wages worth 335 million DM and received a return on assets of 10
percent. Because the works agreement requires management to guarantee at least the
net worth of workers assets and in addition to insure workers assets against
insolvency, the company is bearing the lion’s share of risk. However, during its first
years the VW time asset model prove to be so appealing that approx. 150 companies
showed their interest to copy this concept. In collaboration with the Hypo-Vereinsbank,
a major German bank, VW also started to sell the concept to others.37
Based on the original time asset idea, Volkswagen is now considering introducing an
additional company level pension which supplements the German pay-as-you-go
pension system. This new pension plan, administered by the VW-Pension Trust e.V.,
will enable the company to invest pension money in stock and bond markets but will
also protect employees from the risk of losing even small amounts of their assets in the
event of a market downturn. VW intends to spread the risk of investment across
different segments of the capital market and also guarantees employees a minimum
annual revenue increase of 3 percent. While the company’s traditional company-level
pension plan was administered by management, the VW-Pension Trust e.V. will be
jointly run by management and employee representatives. The company works council
succeeded in negotiating the introduction of terms into the agreement which provide
workers’ representatives with a strong say in the administration of the pension funds.
While representation at the level of the board of directors has not yet been determined,
workers’ representatives will have equal representation at the general meeting of the
trust’s membership38 as well as on the supervisory board.
d. Equal Pay for Men and Women
Although national as well as European level law already prohibits wage discrimination
based on gender, there seems to be (slowly) growing consciousness within the ranks
of several unions about the discriminatory effects of standard patterns of wage
classifications as included into industry wide patterned collective agreements. Wage
classifications, so many studies commissioned by public sector unions found out, which
36 According to Handelsblatt 02.23/24. 2001, („Die Umsetzung des Debis-Tarifwerks fällt noch schwer“)
37 See Financial Times Deutschland, 05.29.2000 („Anlagetipp der Zukunft“) ; Financial Times Deutschland,
05.29.2000 („Mit dem VW Zeitwertpapier für die private Rente sparen“)
38 Each party has 14 votes.
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are based on more general standards instead of on a more detailed and thorough
analysis of work, tend to undervalue jobs usually occupied by women. In their recent
upgrading campaign the public sector union ÖTV now seeks to change the criteria for
work evaluation by demanding more transparent standards. Important dimensions of
such a future evaluation system concern skills requirements, stress at work, leadership
requirements and environmental conditions. In addition, the union also wants to include
criteria originally developed by a team of Swiss specialists on work classification. This
new classification scheme titled ABAKABA39 recognises physical, mental as well as
emotional stress and thus seeks to be a more appropriate method to evaluate in
particular work in service occupations.
The ÖTV took a first step to change work classification schemes and in collaboration
with the municipal government in the city of Hanover the union initiated a joint project
which seeks to compare pay structures in 8 major occupations, four of them each
dominated by men and women. While the union is awaiting to discuss the results of the
project the union made some progress at the margins of the public sector. Although the
public sector master agreement (Bundesangestelltentarifvertrag, BAT) is still including
the old rather discriminatory contract language the ÖTV gained more favourable
contract language in agreements which are just oriented towards the BAT.40 In 1998
and to raise awareness for gender issues in the field of collective bargaining, the ÖTV
created the position of a “gender mainstreaming representative” within the national
union headquarters. While this new position is a symbol for the reorientation of union
policy, it seems to be that the new representatives has only limited powers. After the
ÖTV merged with several other unions to create ver.di, the united service sector union
(for details see section 2 “Mergers and Internal Restructuring”), the new union decided
to extend the gender mainstreaming concept and even included this task into the
union’s new constitution. At the level of the national union headquarters ver.di created
a “gender mainstreaming department” and also commissioned its state-level union
bodies to follow its lead. By Mai 2001, three state-level union bodies had already
appointed gender mainstreaming representatives41.
Beyond the public sector in particular the IG Metall is showing some effort to abolish
pay discrimination. In their Berlin-Brandenburg-Saxony district the metal workers first
adjusted the ABAKABA concept to the special conditions of manufacturing and tested
this new pay classification system (Medea) in some 30 companies. This test proved
that Medea raises pay of those jobs which are typically occupied by women (without
lowering the wages in male occupations)42. Employers, however, resisted the general
introduction of Medea into the collective agreement on grounds that the new
classification system makes labour more costly.
e. Training as a Subject for Collective Bargaining
Although German unions traditionally negotiated collective agreements which include
more than just provisions for pay and working time, provisions on training and
qualification were patchy at best (Bispinck/WSI Tarifarchiv, 2000). In a situation where
low skilled jobs are getting fewer and fewer and where unskilled or semi-skilled
39
„Analytische Bewertung von Arbeitstätigkeiten nach Katz und Baitsch“
40 Interview ÖTV, 02.27.2001 (by Eva Katharina Sarter)
41 See Einblick 11/2001, p. 5
42 Interview IG Metall March 2001 (by Eva Katharina Sarter)
- 28 -
workers face a increasing risk of getting unemployed some unions put training on their
bargaining agenda. In particular the IG Metall district in the state of Baden-
Württemberg is pursuing a revised strategy which is combining quality of work life
issues with individual training entitlements for workers (IG Metall Baden-Württemberg,
2001a). In a recent resolution of the union’s collective bargaining commission the
district laid out its demands for the coming collective bargaining round in Spring 2002.
Among other things the metalworkers demand:
• for each worker there should be an individual training plan to determine future
training measures
• at age 40 and 50 workers should be entitled to 3 months off the job training to
brush up their general knowledge
• after working for 7 years or more at a workplace with cycle times of 5 minutes or
less employees should be entitled to skill upgrading
• management and works council should be required to develop special training
programs for those workers who do not have any formal qualification
• employees should be allowed to switch to part time work or to take a leave of
absence for purposes of further training (IG Metall Baden Württemberg, 2001b).
In the course of three months of intense negotiations, the union was forced to drop
some of its initial demands in particular concerning the pace of work, but the final
settlement was still widely considered to be a landmark in the field of collective
bargaining. Among other things the new agreement entitles employees to have regular
consultations with their employers to determine their needs for future training, it also
provides that training is to be paid for by employers and is to be conducted during
regular working hours. In addition, union and employers agreed to found a new training
agency which will assist companies and employees to improve the maintenance,
adaptation and upgrading of skills43. At this point it is still open whether this regional
agreement will be extended to the national level, but it seems to be remarkable that
after decades of strongly pushing for pay raises and different types of working time
reduction44 qualitative bargaining demands are back on the agenda again. At a larger
scale, the new training agreement somewhat mirrors important aspects of the Debis
case. By including new institutions and procedures for skill adjustment the unions
seeks to advance employees long-term employment perspectives instead of just
defining standards for wages, hours and working conditions.
Taken together the four examples for new and innovative agreements and programs
show that organized labour has the potential to adjust its collective bargaining strategy
and goals to the changing needs of the union’s constituency as well as to company’s
desire for more flexibility. While for a long time unions just complained about the weak
representation of women and white collar employees within the ranks of their
organization, the debis agreement as well as the ÖTV’s and IG Metall’s anti-wage
discrimination efforts may show a way to make unions more appealing to those groups
of employees. In several cases, which is in particular true for issues such as training,
43 For details see, http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2001/07/inbrief/de0107233n.html
44 While in the 1980s the IG Metall focused on the reduction of weekly working time, in late 1990s the
union shifted its attention to issues of early and partial retirement.
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education and working time flexibility, there is even some common ground for joint
solutions with employers and employers association.
At this point in time, the cases presented above are nothing more than promising
experiments which apply to only a limited arena. Such a strategy of limited innovation
serves unions as a vehicle for running calculated risks it also provides a “firewall” that
prevents failed innovations from spreading throughout the entire bargaining unit.
According to our research, this “experimentation” part works quite well. However,
where unions seem to have a problem is to find strategies which help them to diffuse
successful experiments to other parts of the industry. Such a strategy of diffusion not
only requires the ability on part of both social partners, to adjust collective agreements
to the specific conditions of branches and even companies but also to organize a new
consensus within the union organization. As long as provisions within collective
agreements were rather standardised, the process of decision taking within the union’s
bargaining commissions and executive boards was rather transparent. This might
change in the future when the number of issues to be covered by the agreement
increases and the interests of groups of workers within the union diverge. Thus, unions
will be forced to find new procedures and channels through which they speed up the
process of information distribution and democratic decision taking, as well as improve
their ability for a targeted mobilisation of their membership and the exercise of
collective power.
4. Political Action
The German Model of labor relations is rightly characterized as representing the very
opposite of "bread and butter" unionism. From the very outset, labor participated in the
political and economic reconstruction of the Federal Republic (West Germany). Its
economic fundament of success, the soziale Marktwirtschaft, spurned exclusion and
propagated consensus. To counter labor's bid for a potentially dominating role,
employers, tainted by their support of National Socialism, offered extended recognition
and a share of responsibility and decision-making power. Thus the constraints of
historical legacy on the employers' side and the desire for participation on the unions'
side intertwined and grew into a mutually accepted and beneficial arrangement. Under
the aegis of a "reconstruction pact" (Niethammer, 1975: 317) labor and capital in what
amounted to an historical compromise created a system of negotiated interest
regulation that was institutionalized and consolidated during the first three decades of
the West German state.
Politically, this labor-capital pact has been marked by an intensive relationship of the
unions (and the employers) to the political parties. Although DGB officials are
predominantly social democratic, the federation’s credo has been “party neutrality, but
not political neutrality”. Since the SPD embarked on a path to becoming a “people’s
party” in 1959, DGB-SPD ties have steadily weakened, and today, despite the union’s
influence, there is little evidence that the SPD is the party of the unions. (Mahnkopf
2000; Zeuner 2000)
The participatory, regulatory, and negotiated settlement culture of the close-knit web of
institutions and organized interests thrived in the post-war Keynesian world of
economic policy, giving rise not only to the label "Modell Deutschland" – or German
Model – but also in more general terms contributing to the neo-corporatist theorem for
explaining economic adjustment and crisis management (Schmitter, 1981, Cameron,
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1984). Despite recurring class conflicts as well as disputes as to how to regulate the
balance of power, there was an overriding understanding that interest articulation on
the part of one side or the other should not escalate and rupture the high level of
consensus which had been attained. Moreover, this was possible not in the least
because the boundaries of the model's application - the West German state and its
soziale Marktwirtschaft - were clearly defined and accepted.
The most visible expression of this institutionalized consensus structure of Keynesian
economic policy is the "Concertated Action" (Konzertierte Aktion) during the late 1960's
and early 1970's. Here the government brought together the relevant organized
economic interests to steer the economy out of an impending crisis. Under the
guidance of the social democratic Minister of Economics, Karl Schiller, it was the aim of
the Concertated Action to control inflation and reduce unemployment by committing the
trade unions to a policy of wage moderation. For their part, the unions regarded the
Concertated Action as a political instrument for the realization of a fundamental policy
change. Through their participation they would help stabilize the first post-war
government led by the SPD, move forward toward realizing a more just distribution of
goods and attain a new quality of recognition for themselves as a partner in formulating
social and economic policy. Their only condition for participating was that the
Concertated Action would not infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed bargaining
sphere (Tarifautonomie) by dictating wage guidelines (Schroeder/Esser 1999: 4).
While the Concertated Action helped to polish the unions’ image and contributed to a
noticeable increase in membership, there was a strong phalanx of critical voices within
the unions which pointed to the detrimental effects on wage bargaining. And their
arguments seemed to be confirmed as the economy improved while wages remained
locked into multi-year contract agreements45. The resulting "September strikes" of 1969
broke out of this corset and set the stage for a series of considerably better wage
increases in the years 1970 to 1973 which were above the level recommended by the
Concertated Action (Schroeder/Esser 1999: 5). Although this tripartite institution
officially continued to exist until 1977, it had expended its political relevance for all
participants.
Neo-corporatist interest aggregation in the Federal Republic did of course not die with
the end of this particular modus as both informal cooperative arrangements and
numerous formal institutions remained the hallmark of the political bargaining process
(Alemann 1989). The German unions continued to exercise influence, but by the
1980's, the political parameters of this system had altered. The demise of Keynesian
economic policy in general and the advent of a new conservative-liberal coalition
government under Helmut Kohl in 1983 weakened the political position of the unions
noticeably. Over the next several years, the German unions were dealt repeated
political setbacks which only abated in the cooperative atmosphere of the immediate
post-unification period of the early 1990's.
It was perhaps this experience which helped pave the way for the first union initiative
for a new form of organized political bargaining in the interest of reducing
unemployment. At a convention in November, 1995, IG Metall leader Klaus Zwickel
unveiled a proposal for an "Alliance for Jobs" (Bündnis für Arbeit). This programmatic
initiative was directed firstly at the employers in the metalworking and electrical
industries. If they would agree to create a total of 300,000 new jobs over a three year
45 The unions had succumbed to government pressure and their own fear of recession in signing
these contracts. See Schmidt 1971: 109.
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period, his union was prepared to forego wage increases beyond the level of inflation
during the next rounds of contract negotiations. (Zwickel 1995) This was an attempt to
take the momentum generated by the "Volkswagen model" - a highly respected
agreement which went into effect in January 1994 and saved some 30,000 jobs by
reducing the average number of weekly hours to 27.5 - and disseminate its structure
throughout the industry. (Hartz 1994) The government tried to get substantive tripartite
negotiations started on the basis of Zwickel's proposal, hoping that this would improve
its dismal record on reducing unemployment. The employers' associations went along
with this at first, but basically they demurred from direct negotiations with the union on
the grounds that they could not negotiate such a pact since the prerogative for job
creation lay with their members. Instead, they propagated company-level job coalitions.
Those which were initiated turned into something different from what the IG Metall
intended. (Zeuner 1996) Instead of giving up a pay increase to create new jobs, works
councils found themselves negotiating pay cuts (within the limits of the sectoral
contract) to secure existing employment and prevent further dismissals.46
(Rosdücher/Stehle 1996: 319, 325)
a. The "Alliance for Jobs, Training and Competitiveness" since 1998
Against this backdrop, the German unions mounted a full-scale effort to bring about a
change in government in the federal elections of 1998 - and with the victory of the SPD
and the Greens they were successful. But the real goal, as Klaus Lang of the IG Metall
has said, was to effect a substantial "change in politics", i.e. to improve the political
climate and the legal framework of union politics, to put union topics on the political
agenda and to put the unions back into the political arena. Throughout the election
campaign, IG Metall leader Zwickel repeated his call to revive the Alliance, and
Gerhard Schröder, once nominated as SPD chancellor candidate, announced his
support (Müller/Wilke 1999: 109). Once elected, Schröder put his own stamp on the
project, giving it a name (Alliance for Jobs, Training and Competitiveness), a structure
and a direction of his own, much different from the original IG Metall proposal
(Arlt/Nehls 1999).
In December 1998, the government met with employee and employer representatives
to hash out the organizational and programmatic dimensions of the Alliance. A full-
blown apparatus was set up with eight working groups and a steering committee under
the aegis of the Chancellor, his ministers and the leaders of the most important
employers organizations and trade unions (see: http://www.buendnis.de). As originally
formulated, the main goals of the Alliance were as follows:
• lower payroll taxes and a structural reform of the social insurance system;
• more working time flexibility and a reduction of overtime;
• lower corporate taxes;
• "employment supportive wage policies";
• new fields of employment and training opportunities for lesser qualified persons;
46 In their comparison of concession bargaining in the U.S. and "employment securing" collective
bargaining in Germany, Rosdücher und Stehle point out that in regard to the extent and intensity of
the agreements analyzed in both countries, the German unions and works councils had to make
less concessions than their American counterparts.
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• programs to combat youth and long-term unemployment; (Gemeinsame Erklärung -
07.12.98)
Since that first meeting, the Alliance has produced a number of research papers, action
catalogues and statements. Among the most important of these for our topic is the
declaration published by the Federation of German Employers' Associations
(Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände - BDA) and the DGB on July
6, 1999 and supplemented on January 9, 2000. The key passages of both of these
statements call for "a medium- and long-term reliable wage policy. Increases in
productivity should be used primarily to promote employment." (Gemeinsame Erklärung
- 06.07.1999) In the context of the preceding and indeed, ongoing conflicts in Germany
and Europe over trade union wage policies, this statement represented a clear
readiness to forego demands for large percentage increases in favor of so-called
"qualitative arrangements" such as early retirement, flexible hours, part time
employment, and pension schemes.
The political and academic discussion of the Alliance has largely turned on two issues.
The general one is that of its relevance and effectiveness as a whole for finding ways
to drastically reduce the high level of unemployment. A more focused debate has been
over whether the unions have achieved any substantial political and/or socio-economic
goals via the Alliance and - in the same vein - whether participation in the Alliance has
done the unions any good? Up to the present, the Alliance has certainly not produced
any spectacular results, nor has it initiated a comprehensive set of basic reforms in the
system. Union supporters of continued participation in the Alliance, such as DGB
national headquarters, the former DAG, and the IG BCE (mining and chemicals union),
argue however, that they have been able to better the institutional and legal framework
for union activities and bring union influence to bear on government economic policy.
Indeed, according to one union official, much of what has come out of the Alliance and
been turned into official policy has been authored by the unions47.
Further, the Alliance has bound employers to find a common ground of agreement,
preventing them from continuing an uninhibited opt-out from the German model.
Another union official pointed to the impulse the national Alliance has had on the
spread of tripartite structures to the regional (Bundesland) and local (Stadt/Bezirk)
level48. Not only in Bavaria, where government financing of labor market programs
funneled through the Bavarian Alliance has buoyed cooperation, but also in other
regions as well, government, employers and unions are cooperating to match
investments with labor markets (for Northrhein-Westfalia see Nettelstroth/Hülsmann
2000).
Nevertheless, there is a broad current of criticism within the unions toward the Alliance,
ranging from a majority in the former49 HBV (retail, banking and insurance union) and
IG Medien (mass media, publishing and communications) calling for a withdrawal from
the Alliance to those such as ver.di leader Frank Bsirske, who want to remain in the
Alliance but want to make union positions more discernable and the Alliance more
productive. They argue that the government is not really siding with the unions and is
taking the role of moderator, which makes the argument obsolete that union
47 Expert discussion, March 14, 2001
48 Expert discussion, March 15,2001
49 On March 19-21, 2001, the HBV, the IG Medien, the DPG (postal union), the ÖTV (public services
and transport union) and the DAG (German salaried employees union) merged to form ver.di with
nearly 3 million members.
- 33 -
moderation is essential to prevent the employers from withdrawing. Moreover, the
critics point to the meager - if any - achievements of the Alliance in reducing
unemployment. As Bsirske remarked in his acceptance speech at the founding
congress, the drop in unemployment is not only minimal, it is more attributable to
economic growth than to the Alliance, which means that the Alliance has done "damn
little" in solving the problem.
This ongoing debate will presumably extend into the federal election campaign of next
year, in the context of which it may have some import for the strength of union support
for a continuation of the red-green coalition. In our context, the main issue is whether
the Alliance policy of the unions has been an instrument of innovative development or
of union revitalization, and if so in what way? From the material we have gathered and
the discussions we have had with union officials, the assessment of the Alliance as a
source of revitalization is quite limited.
One view was that the Alliance provides the federation headquarters (DGB) with a key
political role. The DGB is the official representative of the unions in the political sphere,
charged with developing a common position among the individual unions within the
federation and conveying this position to the government, the employers and the
general public. To be sure, union negotiations with the government and the employers
over political issues are not dependent on the existence of such an Alliance. But as the
DGB has argued, its existence represents a democratization of interest representation
by making these negotiations more transparent and comprehendible. And, according to
the DGB, the Alliance focuses attention on the federation as the primary representative
of the unions.
In light of the merger process among the DGB unions, the question has been raised as
to the role of the federation in the future. Many observers are hard pressed to define
the place of a weak and financially dependent federation vis-à-vis three to five powerful
member unions capable of independently negotiating with government and employers
on behalf of their own particular interests. By pulling those negotiations into a
formalized and institutionalized structure, the DGB has gained a bargaining role which
it would otherwise not have.
The consequence of that line of argumentation is however that the DGB becomes
dependent on the existence of such an institution as the Alliance and can hardly afford
to have it fall apart. Nor can it watch passively were its most influential member unions
(IG Metall, ver.di, IG BCE) decide to withdraw. The Alliance may have given the DGB
federation headquarters an impetus in maintaining or expanding its policy role, but this
would seem to be a fragile case of revitalization with no long-term perspective.
Another view with a positive assessment of the Alliance and the opportunities it
presents for innovative developments in union political activity emphasizes the spread
of Alliance-politics to the regional and local levels. Again, this is an argument that
came from the federation and not from one of the member unions. But its reference
point is rooted in very straightforward, regional development strategies which may at
once be more concrete and limited than the range of problems being addressed by the
Alliance at the national level. In this sense and at this level, the role of the DGB could
be enhanced through such tripartite mechanisms.
A final reference to possible innovative strategies in regard to political action should be
made at this point. The unions could develop more profile and use the Alliance to
promote women's interests through gender mainstreaming policies. In recognition of
the fact that women's interests were being ignored in the male-dominated world of
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Alliance politics, women from the union-supported Hans-Böckler-Foundation published
a call to set up an "Equality Group - Women's Interests in the Alliance for Jobs" to
monitor the Alliance regarding women's issues and to publicize policy
recommendations. Over 250 women responded and are now involved in the eight
working committees analogous to those of the Alliance. As an example of their work,
the Equality-committee on social security and pension reform raised the gender issue
in regard to pension reform, challenging the bill submitted to parliament by the federal
government after consultations in the Alliance (Kerschbaumer/Veil 2001: 11). Another
committee dealing with finance and tax policy recently published a paper calling on the
government to introduce "gender sensitive budgeting". In regard to the Alliance the
paper recommended "that the qualitative and quantitative advancement of employment
of women should be an essential part of the work of all working committees and special
topical groups." (Knapp/Milde/Buchholz-Will 2001: 109)
To be sure, support for gender mainstreaming is still marginal in many parts of the
German unions. But as a result of the persistent activities of the Equality Group, the
Alliance leadership meeting on March 4, 2001 agreed that the advancement of
women's interests and employment for women is a goal of the Alliance which
transverses all topical divisions and working committees. Moreover, the federal
government committed itself to the presentation of a status report on activities to
improve on equal opportunity for women and men. (Gemeinsame Erklärung,
04.03.2001)
In sum, the Alliance has provided an ongoing forum for exchanging views and
ventilating proposals for reform. But as an instrument of policy it has only produced
meager results. Some of these may be characterized as being quite respectable, but
their overall impact seems to be quite limited. Moreover, the question is still open to
debate as to whether such results might just as well have been achieved through
“normal” political channels without the Alliance.
For the unions, the Alliance has certainly not brought about the kind of reforms which
they imagined to be possible at the outset. Nor have the unions been able to wring
significant concessions from the employers regarding employment policies. And finally,
the unions have found themselves caught in a potential dilemma between accepting
the demands of national competitiveness and the pursuit of supra-national union
solidarity.
b. Works Constitution Reform Act
Without going into details, mention should be made of the largely successful campaign
of the unions in favor of a reform of the Works Constitution Act50. This Act is the legal
basis of works councils in Germany. Since its last revision in the mid-1970s, the law
has lost a considerable measure of its regulatory impact. In a growing number of
instances, the act’s definition of a “normal” workplace is no longer applicable
(Wendeling-Schröder 1999). Moreover, for a variety of reasons, less than 50% of those
enterprises which legally could have works councils, do not.
While employers have been urging the unions to accept their goals of less-regulating
sectoral contracts in favor of an empowerment of enterprise level actors, the unions
have been faced with an erosion of their action radius and effectiveness at the
workplace. As such, since early 1998, the DGB campaigned for a substantial reform of
50 For a good synopsis of the controversy surrounding the government’s drafting of the bill, see
http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2001/03/inbrief/DE0103221N.html (23.03.01)
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the Act. Its goal was to rebuild the legal framework of interest representation at the
workplace. This is an essential for the unions, which rely on the existence of works
councils both as quasi-representatives of the unions and as active recruiters of new
members.
The red-green coalition government drafted a reform bill which largely met with union
approval, although they continued to lobby for more extensive changes to the very
end51. After a heated public debate over the merits of the bill (the employers’
association attacked its provisions vehemently, threatening to challenge its
constitutionality), it was passed by parliament and has now become law.
Much has been at stake for the unions in this controversy. The dual system of interest
representation in Germany has turned on having strong unions to negotiate sectoral
contracts with a very high degree of coverage and legally-based enterprise-level
interest representation (works councils), which are union-oriented and have a close
working arrangement with the unions. Works councils are dependent on a legal basis
for securing their bargaining position vis-à-vis employers. To be sure, the legal
framework alone is insufficient. Both unions and works councils need to develop
interest representation strategies which go beyond the protective mechanisms of the
law. As several cases in recent years have shown (Duschek/Wirth 1999; Wirth 1999),
there is an acute danger that even an improved legal framework will prove ineffective
wherever work organization workplace structures become “networked” and “virtualized”
(Sydow/Wirth 1999). Successful representation then depends ever more on cross-
enterprise cooperation and collective bargaining as well as on carrying conflicts to the
public. Mixing the dual spheres of interest representation in Germany will be an
essential for German union revitalization.
5. Coalition Building
We argue that unions should foster coalitions with new social movements (NSM) (e.g.
women, peace, gay, anti-nuclear, environment, third-world, anti-fascism, anti-
globalization, unemployed) for three main reasons. First, to express their social
responsibility into new societal problems (i.e. to enlarge the topics unions and to attract
new membership constituencies); second to tap additional resources for common goals
(e.g. joint campaigns; learning from NSM mobilizing tools); and third to recruit potential
activists from different organizations.
A cooperation with NSM is of particular importance for German unions because NSM
take a leading position in Germany compared to other industrial countries and hence
are strong competitors for members (Brand 1985; Dalton and Küchler 1990; Kriesi et
al. 1995). Moreover, a possible alliance between old and new social movements seems
critical to combat the declining attraction (Bindungskraft) of unions in a post-industrial
world (e.g. decline of working class constituencies; feminization and individualization of
the labor market) (Touraine et al. 1987). It is an open secret that unions have finally
realized that class conflict and social partnership do not have the cohesive power
among its members and the public anymore (Marßolek 1999). Subsequently, unions
need to modernize themselves by incorporating new issues which keeps existing
members and attracts a wider (more heterogeneous, and younger) constituency.
51 Union arguments are documented at http://www.boeckler.de/service/mbf/betrvg/gewerkpos.htm
(23.03.01)
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Another reason is that membership in groups becomes increasingly fragmented and
flexible (group identities are less stable in people’s biographies then they were in the
past) and unions increasingly compete for members with NSM especially among the
youth. In contrary to unions NSM do not mobilise on the basis of narrowly defined
socio-economic group interests but “they signify a shift from group-based political or
economic cleavages to value- and issue-based cleavages that identify only
communities of like-minded people” (Dalton and Kuechler 1990:12).
Finally, unions might learn from new, innovative forms of communication, organization,
decision-making and strategy formulation which seem to characterise NSMs (Krüger
2000:12). NSM do not produce “exclusive, cohesive, clientilistic associations” (Dalton
and Kuechler 1990:13) which are typical for the centralistic, hierachically organized
unions. Rather, whereas unions perform within a corporatistic elitist model of
bargaining with other interest groups, NSM have a complex, fluid basis-democratic
decision-making process in open, non-hierachical networks and have unconventional
ways of political lobbying and mobilizing the public (Krüger 2000:13).
The question is to what extent German unions open themselves to NSM topics and use
coalition building as a strategy of revitalization and what are its possible problems and
opportunities. New social movements and old social movements (unions) have quite
different cultures, different political styles (Politikstil), organizational structures, action
forms, socio-structural membership bases, interests and values which might impede
their cooperation (Dalton et al. 1990; Jahn 1996; Krüger 1986; Offe 1985). Touraine et
al. (1987) even argue that they are incompatible organizations and hence that
cooperation is not possible.
There are hardly any empirical studies on the relationship between NSM and unions in
Germany (Krüger 2000:31) and we provide a first attempt to address these issues. We
selected four new social movements which have a particular importance in the current
German context: environment, anti-rightwing radicalism, anti-globalization, and the
movement of the unemployed. The green movement was selected because of its
continuing overwhelming importance in the German political culture; the anti-fascism
movement is of particular relevance with regard to the significant increase of right-wing
organizations, violence and public culture in Germany; the anti-globalization movement
was selected because of its growing international importance (especially in the US);
and the unemployed movement was chosen because of its relevance in terms of the
high unemployment in Germany.
Overall, we analyse unions’ awareness and utilisation of these topics for their
movement (e.g. are there special union departments dealing with environmental
issues; do unions debate these issues internally and externally), and their desire to
build coalitions with the new social movements and to learn from them.
Interviews52 were conducted with officials at headquarters and regional/local level of
the DGB and a representative sample of the German union movement in 2000/2001,
nine unions which differ in size, sector, and ownership (IGM, IG BCE, ÖTV, HBV,
NGG, IG BAU, Transnet, GdP, GEW).
52 We wish to thank our students, Nina Wichmann and Kevin Dewald for conducting these interviews.
The interviews were semi-structured and lasted in average one hour.
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a. Green movement
Compared to the other NSMs the green (environmental, ecological) movement
provides the strongest challenge for the German labour movement. It is not only the
oldest, largest53 and most institutionalised NSM in Germany (originating from the early
70s) but it has at its core a radical transformation of the existing industrial society, the
very backbone of unions. The concept of “sustainable growth” (which became the core
leitbild of the green movement after Rio) argues for “a development which satifies
current societal needs without risking that future generations cannot fulfill their needs”
(Brundtland report 1987:46). Thus, the transformed industrial model would need to
fulfill material needs and at the same time has to guarantee that the negative
consequences of production, distribution and consumption for humans and nature are
minimised (Krüger 2000:2). This vision challenges the current concept of the industrial
society and the leitmotivs and values of its actors such as unions. It favours a “post-
industrial” society with an emphasis on the quality of life which is not quantifiable in
pure material terms (income growth etc.). In particular, it challenges unions’ core
assumption that economic growth is necessary for a better working people’s life, e.g.
for a larger distribution scope (Verteilungsspielraum) and more welfare. One should not
forget that the basic compromise between labour and capital is based on the
productivity pact (the distribution of increasing profits between the bargaining parties).
The question is really whether social and ecological interests can be compatible.
From a historical perspective the relationship between unions and the green movement
has dramatically changed over the last thirty years. Unions had a rather hostile
relationship to the green movement when it developed during the 1970s (e.g. unions
were strongly in favour of nuclear energy) (see for example the DGB
Grundsatzprogramm 1972 “qualitative development”). Distrust, ignorance, conflicts and
incompatible demands characterized their communication. During the 1980s the
dialogue became more reasonable, partly because of increasing ecological
catastrophes (Seveso, Sandoz, Tschernobyl; dying forests) and greater sensitivity and
interest in the German public sphere, and partly because environmental friendly
production was increasingly seen as a potential niche for the German industry which
could create new jobs.
In particular, the UNCED conference in Rio de Janeiro 1992 became a threshold for an
increasing dialogue between unions and environmental organizations. However, union
interest was limited as increasing economic problems forced them refocus on bread
and butter issues (consequences of unification, recession etc.). Indeed, it took a major
study “The future of Germany” by two well-known NGOs, BUND and Misereor in 1996
to rekindle the dialogue between the two sides.
In short, during the 1990s the DGB developed various ecological projects: e.g. DGB
commission “protection of humans and the environment” (1992); a large research
project “work and ecology” which incorporated various research institutes (1998); the
“Alliance for work and environment” between DGB, government, employer associations
and environmental organizations, one product of which is a government-subsidized
project to renovate old buildings in an environmentally friendly way.
Moreover, the DGB has been increasingly engaged in building coalitions with the
environmental movement. For example, in 1991 the DGB and the green organization
“Deutscher Natur Ring” announced a continuing cooperation (e.g. workshops,
53 2 million members in the early 90s (Meyer 1992:10).
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conferences, joint programmes) which includes officials of various individual unions
and of different green movements. Both organizations were also the organizers of the
public event, the “German environment day” (Deutscher Umwelttag) in 1992.
In addition there are various initiatives between individual unions and green
organizations (see Krüger 2000:37). To give just a few examples: environmental traffic
reform (IG Metall with DNR 1990; IGM youth and BUND youth 1992, 94, 95; IG Metall,
DGB, BUND 1995); “climate conservation (CO2 reduction) and workplaces” (IG BAU
and Greenpeace 1999); “ecological products and health and safety regulations as eco
politics (Umweltschutz)” (IG Medien and Greenpeace 1992; DGB and BUND 1994).
Individual unions differ in their approaches to environmental issues. The decisive factor
is not the union’s political leaning but rather the relative importance of the environment
for the specific sector. The IG BCE for example is heavily involved with environmental
issues since they organize members in the chemical, mining and energy sector
(including employees of the nuclear power stations). The IG BCE was strongly
opposed to the growing green movement during the 1970s, but since the mid 1980s,
environmental policies have become a key policy area directly represented on the
union board (Vorstandsbereich I). However, the IG BCE’s main priority is still to pursue
a cooperative industrial policy together with the employers and to foster environmental
concepts only if they do not endanger the industry (see Kädtler/Hertle1997). The
IG BCE maintains no formal cooperation with environmental organizations.
Other unions which potentially benefit from a job growth in ecological friendly sectors
are more innovative. The IG BAU (Bauen, Agrar, Umwelt) for example is probably the
most innovative union in this regard, partly because it sees the eco-friendly
construction industry as a growing job creator (Wiesehügel 1996). They cooperate with
Greenpeace for an ecologically sound renovation of buildings (e.g. they initiated an
official mark of quality for building companies which includes ecological and social
criteria (e.g. health and safety, keeping to the bargaining agreements).
To a lesser extent the IGM currently works on a joint declaration for the restructuring of
the industrial society (Umbau der Industriegesellschaft) with two environmental groups,
BUND and NABU. The railway union, Transnet, initiated a long-term project, “the
alliance for trains (and against lorries)” (Allianz pro Schiene) in 1991 which includes 17
environmental organizations and is now a registered body (eingetragener Verein).
However, such an initiative is the exception. In most cases involvement with green
organizations is sporadic, short-term and informal, leading at most to joint declarations
or mutual invitations to workshops and congresses.
Finally, to what extent did the union movement incorporate the aims and values of the
green movement into their own agenda? The term “sustainable development” has
entered various union statements and agendas of the DGB and individual unions (e.g.
umweltpolitische Grundsatzerklärungen of IG BAU, IG BCE, IGM). For example, the
DGB programme (Grundsatzprogramm) (1996:16) describes sustainable growth as one
aim of the union movement. It is interpreted as a “new quality of growth”, an “ecological
definition of the competitive advantage of German industry” (Standortpolitik), and a
“just order of the world economy”. Today, unions are explicitly in favour of the end of
nuclear power, alternative energy, the transformation of the traffic/transport system,
social and ecological criteria for the global economy (Der Grosse Ratschlag 2000:15).
Moreover, it should be noted that in the area of health and safety at workplaces
environmental demands have been widely implemented.
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However, the conceptualization of sustainable growth does not question the dominant
industrial model, unions aim for a socio-ecological reform of the market economy but
not its transformation (Zahrnt 1996). The pillars of expanding production, consumption
and traditional paid labor are not challenged. For example, the mission statement of
the IGM includes sustainable growth as one aim of the union but this does not
influence its collective bargaining, industrial or economic policies (Krüger 1998:102).
Even its such macro-political initiatives as the “Alliance for Jobs” do not press for
sustainable growth. On the other hand, the IG BAU took the link between work and
ecology as an outspoken strategic aim of their merger between GGLF and IG BSE
(Krüger 1998:103). According to Krüger IG BAU tries concretely to integrate social and
ecological aims into their political strategies and actions.
These differences among unions can be traced back to their sector’s possibility to gain
from eco-friendly, alternative production and services.
To conclude, today the fierce antagonism of the 1970s is over and both sides see it as
advantageous to communicate. However, although both sides support the socio-
ecological reform of the economy it is not clear how reliable unions will be in the future
and how strongly they are dependent on economic developments. Thus, during the
recession in the early 1990s unions focused much stronger on bread and butter issued
than on green topics. Moreover, many unions are still avoiding a debate about the
potential conflicts between the industrial model and the concept of sustainable growth.
Most unions (except IG BCE and IG BAU) also lack personnel and financial resources
to sufficiently engage in ecological issues within and outside of their organization
(Krüger 2000:45). And frequently, the officials for green issues are also in charge of
the youth, women and education.
b. Anti – ‘rightwing radicalism’
Anti-rightwing extremism has a long history in the German labor movement since the
1930s, however after WW II the topic gradually lost its importance until a sudden re-
emergence in the late 1990s. In particular, 1998 signaled a turning point. This is when
the DGB initiated a special commission to analyse rightwing radicalism (including neo-
fascism, racism, anti-Semitism, nationalism, anti-immigration etc.) in Germany and its
relevance for unions and to suggest strategies as to how unions should react. The
specific peg was a planned demonstration of neo-Nazis in May 1997 in Leipzig which
caused the DGB Saxony office to petition for a formal ‘commission’ at the 16th national
DGB congress. Moreover, the DGB und its unions were increasingly confronted with a
growing neo-fascist movement in east and west Germany after the political unification
and felt they were obliged to react. In addition, a nation-wide survey of employees in
1998 (WDR2 infratest/dimap) found that union members are disproportionately more
rightwing radical than non-union members (which was supported by earlier smaller
studies, e.g. Horn et al. 1995). Unsurprisingly this result found considerable media
attention and served to activate the labor movement.
The challenge for unions today is thus not just a political mandate to participate in a
democratic response against right-wing radicalism and to actively combat its causes
but also to react to rightwing tendencies within its own organization.
The DGB and its unions have developed various activities which we will discuss below
but also written documents outlining their interpretation and position. Most important is
the report produced by the DGB commission on the development of rightwing
radicalism in Germany, its causes and possible explanations and potential responses
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(DGB commission report 2000). It can be assumed that this report mirrors the current
discussion within the union movement how to understand and react to rightwing
radicalism.
The report starts with a description of rightwing radicalism in Germany (violent events,
successes of rightwing political parties, significant tendencies among the youth and in
East Germany, rightwing tendencies in public attitudinal surveys etc.) and of rightwing
attitudes among union members (referring to the WDR survey but also to other studies
(Held et al. 1994) or surveys on voting patterns of union members - e.g. in the 1992
regional election in Baden-Württemberg union members comprised 30% of the voters
of the rightwing party “Republicans”). It then summarizes theories attempting to explain
rightwing radicalism in general and the recurrence in (East) Germany in particular. The
focus is on psychological theories (personality, deprivation, disintegration / individ-
ualization, political culture). For example, Heitmeyer (1992) is quoted as arguing that
young people who have identity problems especially in a highly individualised
environment are more likely to become rightwing. The reasons why union members are
more rightwing boils down to gender differences and the fact that employees who are
afraid loosing their jobs are more likely to become union members and hence might be
more open for populist attacks against foreign workers (Gastarbeiter). Moreover, it is
argued that modernisation, globalisation, individualisation, increasing competition,
increasing cost-benefit calculations and ‘Standort’-debates all lead to the decrease of
solidarity and increase of individual survival strategies.
Finally, the report outlines practical steps for unions. The aim is in the short-range to
combat rightwing radicalism at workplaces, in the middle range to change racist
attitudes at workplaces, and in the long range to actively support equal opportunities
policies (Gleichstellungspolitik) at the shop-floor level, in union training programmes, in
schools and apprenticeship schools, in the media/public, and in politics. A DGB
working group has now the task to create various union-initiated projects and to foster
and coordinate initiatives among individual unions.
For example with regard to initiatives on shop-floor level the DGB works currently on a
sample company collective agreement (Musterbetriebsvereinbarung) which should
implement the EU directives on anti-discrimination (Florence agreement 1995). A
similar initiative is pursued by the IG Metall. These agreements should for example
allow to fire somebody who persistently shows racist attitudes and behaviour at
workplace level. And they should oblige management to monitor equal opportunities for
foreign workers. One should note that some works councils have already negotiated
workplace agreements on equal treatment for foreign employees and ethnic minorities
(e.g. Jenaoptik, VW, Ford, Thyssen, Deutsche Bahn).
In terms of the educational work within unions the topics “racism” and ”discrimination”
are projected to be incorporated in all seminars (example DGB-Bildungswerk
Thüringen). Some unions already have specific seminars on these topics (e.g. IG BCE)
and some unions also provide seminars specifically for their foreign members.
In schools and professional schools various projects to raise the awareness for
combating racism have been initiated by unions and/or political parties (e.g. DGB youth
Saxony; e.g. Projektschultage - fuer Demokratie, Courage zeigen”).
In terms of the media and the public, unions are increasingly participating in organizing
public campaigns and demonstrations (e.g. Berlin demonstration spring 2001) and
publish declarations condemning racist tendencies in society and demanding active
engagement.
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The DGB is explicitly interested in cooperating with other social movements on this
issue. Yet, this happens mostly at local or regional but not at national level. An
exception is the loose “network against racism, for equal rights” which was initiated in
1998 and consists of over 100 NGOs which are active in the anti-racism and anti-
immigrant work. They developed an ‘action plan’ with ideas how to combat rightwing
radicalism on a political level (what government, regions, communes and civil
organizations should do): e.g. the creation of an anti-discrimination law which goes in
more specific details (discrimination in private life, job, courts etc.) than the general
constitutional anti-discrimination law (Art. 3 Grundgesetz); further modernisation of the
immigration law (Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht) and asylum rights, anti-racism education
in schools, activities at workplaces (e.g. management-works council cooperation and
workplace agreements in combating discrimination).
A coordination among individual unions is provided through the DGB working group,
other kinds of cooperation happen mostly at local level and depend on the initiative of
individual union officials.
The issue ‘rightwing radicalism’ is in most cases not institutionalised in individual
unions (e.g. no specific department is responsible). It is a topic which touches various
departments but there is rarely a central coordination (in some unions which have a
high percentage of foreigners the issue is coordinated in one department named
“women and foreign employees”). Exceptions may be found for example in the HBV,
which has a chatsite on their internet homepage on the topic of racism/anti-fascism and
encourages locals to inform others about their activities, or in the IG Metall and
IG BCE. Both unions provide special training programmes for foreign members as well
as workshops on racism and conflict management for foreign and German union
members.
Most action happens at local level. For example, there are some promising examples of
local cooperation between unions and anti-fascist organizations, especially in east
Germany such as the regional organization “for democracy and tolerance” in
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (created in 1999) which was initiated by local politicians and
union officials. However, the cooperation with other NSMs are in most cases only
sporadic and temporary, and are initiated frequently as a response to some rightwing
violent local event. More long term modes of cooperation (as they exist for example in
Thüringen) are difficult to sustain partly because of the extremely different
organizations of the basic-democratic, decentralised antifa movements and the unions.
Thus, in most cases initiatives depend on the individual interest of local or regional
union officials to develop activities and initiate cooperation with other local unions and
NSMs. These initiatives are not coordinated centrally and frequently leaders at the
national level have no overview of the activities at local level.
Finally, similar to the discussion on the green movement the reason why some unions
seem to be more actively engaged in anti-rightwing activities than others has mainly
structural reasons but also depends on individual union official’s interests. Structural
reasons include the percentage of foreigners in the sectoral workforce and union
membership, the labour market situation (high unemployment raises anti-immigrant
feelings) but also the political position of the union (e.g. traditional left-wing unions
such as the IG Metall and HBV are more likely to be active than less politically
engaged unions).
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In sum, there has definitely been a significant increase in German unions’ awareness
and activity against rightwing radicalism in the last five years. However, there seems to
be some uncertainty about how to react to rightwing tendencies among its own
members. Unions concentrate on condemning rightwing violence and positioning
themselves publicly against rightwing political parties and their policies. Little is done
to open up the difficult discourse about union values and policies and union members
attitudes. Can unions safeguard job security of their members and on the other hand
favour an open immigrant policy? And little is done so far to coordinate different
initiatives at local, regional and national level (among unions and other NSMs) and to
use the topic actively for union revitalisation (new networks, modernising the old-
fashioned image of unions etc.).
Critical voices also highlight the fact that the explanations and policies advanced by
the unions omit structural causes of rightwing radicalism, for example that rightwing,
nationalistic attitudes increase through globalisation (Dieckmann express 2000). Some
critics hold that unions might only be able to really combat rightwing radicalism if they
challenge current neo-liberal postulates more forcibly (e.g. Dieckmann 2000;
Heitmeyer 1992). Moreover, Dieckmann argues that when unions become primarily
service providers and when solidarity is not a lived reality anymore, attitudes of
(German) union members may turn against foreign colleagues once job security is on
the agenda. Heitmeyer (1992:624) adds that in particular young unionists are
increasingly losing an identification with the values of their union and as such become
more open for rightwing propaganda. New flexible work practices, especially flexible
working time, increasingly instrumentalizes labor and undermines solidarity and group
feelings at workplace level.
Changing attitudes through education and equal opportunity policies is to be welcomed
but it is doubtful whether they can combat the underlying structural reasons. In this
vein, both Dieckmann and Heitmeyer are critical of the DGB report because it does not
acknowledge that the unions have backed policies to protect the German “Standort”
(competitive advantage of the German production site) in the interest of saving jobs.
without questioning the effects of such a national approach on the rise of rightwing
radicalism. Changing values and attitudes is what unions want but arguably the unions
need to wage the “battle of ideas” (Hyman 1999) to move forward toward this goal. At
present, pragmatism holds the upper hand, projecting social visions is not on the union
agenda.
c. Anti-globalization
Although globalization is such a catchword in the current public debate, unions are
only concerned with very specific consequences of globalization. There is no intensive
debate about the advantages and disadvantages of globalization as which resembles
the one currently taking place in the U.S. German unions do not participate in any
political campaigns against globalization nor have they participated in any major anti-
globalization demonstrations such as Seattle, Washington, Prague or Davos. Unions
are primarily interested in two topics, international labor standards and social clauses,
and both are organizationally situated in the departments for “economic policy”
(Wirtschaftspolitische Referate). The demand for social clauses in international trade
and production is a longstanding demand and is particularly relevant for the clothing
and textile industry. As such, the German textile union GTB, now merged with the IGM,
has created close contacts with organizations such as Terre des hommes and church
organizations in the third world.
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Moreover, the DGB lobbied for social trade clauses (no child work etc.) at the WTO
long before Seattle. The DGB is also engaged in developing a code of conduct for
German MNCs jointly with employers’ associations, the German government and some
NGOs (FIAN, Transfer) (“round table of code of conduct”, 2000). It is also currently
engaged in lobbying for social criteria in the government securities ‘HERMES’ for
special risky foreign investments of German firms. Finally, one should not forget that
German unions’ concern to financially and organizationally strengthen the labor
movement in central eastern Europe and to politically support an early EU enlargement
is also guided by their interest to avoid social dumping and to risk German jobs by the
lower labor costs in the East.
The most prominent union campaign on international labor standards is the “campaign
for clean clothes” (Kampagne für Saubere Kleidung) which was initiated in the
Netherlands in 1990 and adopted in Germany by the textile union. Since 1997 it is
coordinated by the DGB (and includes the IGM, HBV, and 17 NGOs). Other similar
initiatives are the “campaign for fair flowers” and the “campaign for bananas”. Finally,
there are some coalitions between individual unions and globalization movements such
as the cooperation between the HBV (retail, banking, insurance) and the French
network for the democratic control of the international financial markets (ATTAC). The
HBV is also planning a world congress on deregulation with 350 unionists from all over
the world and representatives of NGOs.
A problem of these coalitions is the potential conflict between interests of union
members and of these other social movements. German unions are not against
globalization as such but only against social dumping. A major reason is clearly the
heavy export-orientation of the German industry but also the fact that German MNCs
are not yet notoriously known for their “bad conduct” in the Third World as some
American brand-name companies (Nike, Gap).
In sum, globalization is an issue for unions with regard to social dumping abroad. As
with the other social movements coalitions are rare and there is no strategy to use the
anti-globalization movement to revitalize the labor movement as it is currently
happening in the US.
d. Unemployment movement
It is surprising that despite the consistently high unemployment figures in Germany
over the last two decades it has taken the unions quite long to actively provide support
for unemployed members. Their preferred reaction to the high unemployment in
Germany has been to influence labor market and economic policies of the government
and to create employment enhancing concepts with the employers’ associations and
government. An example of this approach is the tripartite Alliance for Jobs. For the
most part, unemployed members do not receive different services than employed
members and there are few specific efforts to keep unemployed members in the
unions.
Unions have not appointed officials explicitly in charge of unemployed members. At
best, we found individual activists in some unions who became involved on their own
initiative. There is little understanding that it might be beneficial in the long run to keep
unemployed members in the union, to assist them in finding training possibilities and
new jobs. A potential problem is of course that unemployed workers might find a new
job in a different industry and hence will need to change the union.
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Some unions such as the IG BAU argue that it is difficult to have a centralised
programme for unemployed in a union which covers sectors with very different
unemployment rates. Other unions such as the IG BCE argue plainly that “the union
represents employed members and not unemployed ones”. “The IG BCE only deals
with the problems of their unemployed members if those approach the union.”
(interview B Mähler, IG BCE). Moreover, union officials take the position that it is their
goal to create new full-time jobs for the unemployed and not to provide remedies which
would establish a low wage labor market for long term unemployed in competition with
the unionised sectors (interview with Frau Gehrlich, HBV).
Consequently, coordination with organizations representing the unemployed is rare. If
at all unions cooperate with the official unemployment agencies (Arbeitsämter) or with
the coordinating office for “union activities on unemployment” in Bielefeld (KOS,
Koordinationsstelle gewerkschaftlicher Arbeitslosenarbeit) and the European NGO
“Euromarsch”. KOS was found in 1986 and is financed by the IGM, ÖTV and the
Länder Northrhein-Westfalia and Lower Saxony. It has the goal to improve the contact
between the employed and unemployed workforce and is used as a link between
unions and other unemployed organizations. KOS has close contacts with the IGM and
ÖTV but other unions cooperate as well. “Euromarsch” was initiated by French and
German unemployed in 1997 who did not see their interests being sufficiently
represented by the union movement and political parties and is partly coordinated by
KOS. According to Renate Knapper (ÖTV) there is a latent conflict between
Euromarsch, which is critical of the EU policies, and the Europe-friendly German
unions.
In sum, unemployment is regarded as an economic and a societal problem but not as
an organizational or membership problem for unions. As a consequence, unions have
seen little need for cooperation with unemployment organizations.
To conclude, our review reveals different levels of involvement between German
unions and the NSMs. There are also differences between the union treatment of the
four social movements. For example, unionists attach a high degree of importance to
the environmental and the anti-fascism movement, while the anti-globalization and
unemployment movement seem not as relevant. Moreover, we found that although a
certain awareness among the union movement exists in all four cases, the extent to
which these topics are organizationally institutionalized and the extent to which
initiatives and coalitions are developed largely depends on the individual union’s size
(large unions are more likely to have special departments responsible for these topics
than smaller ones) and on the relevance of the issue for the specific union. By that we
mean that in most cases the involvement is not dependent on the political stance of the
union but to what extent the organization is directly affected by the issue: e.g. how
many foreign members the union has, the extent of export-orientation and global
competition, environmental problem in production, whether the sector is more industrial
or service oriented, and how many union members are unemployed.
Finally, coalition building with other social movements is rare and mostly short-term
and not integrated into a long term revitalization strategy. Coalitions that do exist are
rarely centrally organized. Most activities happen at the local level and depend on the
initiative of local unionists. It is evident that unions seem so far not to able to translate
the awareness of these new movements into a coherent revitalization strategy.
However, Müller-Jentsch’s pessimism (1990:409) that “the relationship between NSM
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and unions is a sad chapter of the German labour movement” cannot be completely
supported. There is increasing evidence of initiatives and also of coalition building, but
they differ widely in intensity, purpose and organizational level.
6. Cross-Border Trade Union Collaboration: "It always takes two to tango"
The strategy field of international collaboration as seen from the perspective of the
German unions is dominated by the question of their European engagement. German
union officials are certainly participants in international trade union activities. But for
the few exceptions which have been presented in the previous section of this paper on
coalition building, there is nothing essential to report at the global level in regard to
German trade union revitalization. This may be a cause for alarm in light of the
accelerating pace of globalization. Nevertheless, we would argue with Jon Erik Dolvik
that "it is hard to see how the erosional impact of borderless competition can be
prevented by incitement of a new brand of global labor activism or social clauses"
alone. "Such bottom-up and top-down initiatives are important but unlikely to succeed
unless they are linked together by coherent regional structures with force to co-
ordinate union demands, mobilize pressure on governments and institutions at the
international levels, and ensure credible compliance." (Dolvik 2000: 59)
Trade union collaboration at the European level has definitely not reached such a point
yet, but nevertheless, it presents a picture of change, development and some
innovation. As Jeremy Waddington wrote in a recent article on European trade unions
in transition, "trade union activity at supra-national level is required to protect what
remains of national trade union embeddedness from the damaging effects of
internationalisation" (Waddington 2000: 325) German unions have recognized the
importance of bilateral and European cooperation and have begun to earmark more
resources for activities at these levels. Lowell Turner has argued that over the past
decade, a structural framework of regulations, institutions and organizations for labor
relations has been created within the European Union (EU) which provides the unions
with a "political opportunity structure" (Turner 1996: 339) for action. Indeed, unions
have created and have at their disposal a wide variety of instruments to use in
pursuing cross-border activities within the EU, the most important of which are the
following:
• The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) as the organization of national
trade union federations (66 federations from 29 countries) and 12 European
Industry Federations;
• The European Industry Federations which unite national unions along sectoral
lines;
• Multilateral cooperation committees such as the so-called Doorn group composed
of union representatives from Germany and the Benelux countries
• Regional cross-border wage bargaining partnerships such as initiated by the
district committee of the IG Metall in Northrhein-Westfalia in cooperation with
union representatives in neighboring countries;
• Multi-country union representation at international construction sites;
• Bilateral union exchanges and agreements on membership rights and recognition;
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• Inter-regional Trade Union Committees. Local cross-border cooperation along the
national borders of member states as well as between member states and
accession countries;
• European Works Councils.
The following presentation will focus on the thrust and status of selected European-
level activities of the German unions as participants in EU-wide initiatives. The aim of
this selection is to focus on the kind of involvement which extends beyond the
traditional context of international trade union activities and offers a basis for possible
new developments and constellations. In addition to the informational content we will
endeavor to evaluate the effectiveness of such activities, their middle and long range
prospects, and their relevance for union revitalization in Germany. What kinds of new
activities are German unions developing and for which reasons? How do these
European-level activities coordinate with existing domestic goals and activities? Is
there evidence of an integration of European and domestic activities or of cooperation
among German unions in their European involvements? And are German unions
developing strategies designed to realize a European "transnational social area"
(Jacobi 2000: 12)?
a. The Social Dialogue
The Social Dialogue was first introduced into the EEC treaty in 1987 as a means of
activating the social partners to develop "contractual relations". Since its inception it
has been used only exceptionally, and up to the present, the number and quality of
agreements reached by negotiations between the ETUC and UNICE/CEEP for the
employers has been minimal (Kuhlmann 1998). Recently, however, there has been
increased interest in the Social Dialogue as a sectoral instrument of negotiations
(Keller/Bansbach 2000). However one measures the input of German unions into this
neo-corporatist instrument of European politics, the prospects of the Social Dialogue
developing into a major playing field of cross-border trade union collaboration are slim.
Simply stated, the unions have no real instruments for pressuring the employers to
negotiate. Ross and Martin have pointed out that the "ETUC has so far developed
largely by borrowing resources from European institutions to gain legitimacy with its
own national constituents and by using the openings provided by these European
institutions to try to elicit changes in employer behaviors." (Martin/Ross 1999: 358)
This conclusion may also be applied to the sectoral level as well. Only when the
employers have a vested interest in market regulation for their own protection - such as
in the case of posted workers (Sörries 1997) - will they be willing to make use of this
instrument.
b. The Declaration of Doorn: A multi-national, multi-branch initiative
The Doorn54 cooperation group was initiated in 1996 by the Belgian trade union
federations in response to a government move to set a wage ceiling based on wage
increases in Germany, France and the Netherlands. At a first meeting in 1997, the
54 The name is taken from the town in the Netherlands where the group met in 1998 and signed an
agreement.
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participants55 agreed on a regular exchange of information, reciprocal invitations to
domestic bargaining rounds and annual meetings. The following year, unions from
Germany56, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed a declaration pledging
wage coordination in the interest of preventing "a bidding down of collectively
bargained incomes between the participating countries, as sought by the employers.
The trade unions see this neighborly initiative as a step towards European cooperation
on collective bargaining." To achieve this goal, the unions agreed to the following
principles:
• "to achieve collective bargaining settlements that correspond to the sum total of
the evolution of prices and the increase in labor productivity;
• … to achieve both the strengthening of mass purchasing power and employment-
creating measures (e.g. shorter work times);
• … [to] inform and consult each other on developments in bargaining policy."
(Doorn 1998)
The announcement of this agreement was a surprise to many unionists in as much as
up until this point, matters of multinational wage bargaining coordination had been the
responsibility of the ETUC. At the follow-up meeting of the Doorn group in September
1999, the ETUC was present to hear that the wage bargaining goals agreed upon the
previous year had been achieved in the 1999 round of negotiations. As such, the
participants confirmed their interest in continuing their cooperation (Gewerkschaftliches
Gipfeltreffen 1999).
The fact that the 1999 bargaining rounds in all of the participating countries could be
regarded as acceptable and in line with the agreed formula probably saved this
cooperative initiative from being abandoned before it had gotten settled. Had the
unions had to face the kinds of problems resulting from the 2000 bargaining round they
might have decided to call off the meeting and put an end to further efforts of wage
coordination. At least the German unions were the object of criticism at the meeting in
September 2000, because their composite wage increases of 2.3% fell far below the
4.1% increase in inflation and productivity (Benelux 2000; Mermet/Janssen 2000). The
conclusions drawn from this however indicate a readiness to take a longer term
perspective and discuss a variety of factors influencing bargaining outcomes, including
trade union strategies.
It is obvious that such a cooperative initiative can not survive without German
participation, but that it will not survive if the other national unions feel that the German
unions are not seriously adhering to the common goals as formulated. As for the
importance of the Doorn group for revitalization in the German unions, it can only be
said that the existence of the group and its wage formula is part of an ensemble of
references at the European level and has become a recognized fix-point and in the
wage bargaining considerations of union headquarters (Kreimer-de Fries 1999: 196).
Moreover, the signatures of the largest and most powerful DGB unions to the
55 The French unions did not participate, apparently because the federation representatives from the
other countries regarded French union structures and interests to be too heterogeneous to be
effectively integrated into the group. Expert discussion, March 09, 2001.
56 The German participants represented the DGB and its member unions IG BAU, IG BCE, ÖTV and
IGM as well as the DAG.
- 48 -
declaration of Doorn could enable the DGB to strengthen its role as internal organizer
and coordinator of union wage policy.
c. Wage bargaining coordination at the sectoral level. Some examples
The goal of the European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) is to coordinate the wage
bargaining policies of its member unions and prevent wage dumping based on its
"European Coordination Rule" which is essentially the same formula as used by the
Doorn group. While the EMF recognizes the autonomy of its members, it also attaches
to that recognition the responsibility of utilizing the full scope of what is determined to
be the distributional component. However, according to the EMF annual report for
1999/2000 on collective bargaining policy, the problems associated with the
determination of this component and its comparative evaluation are immense. To apply
its "European Coordination Rule", the EMF needs the hard data on productivity gains
and inflation as a bottom line. But only the German IGM and the Austrian metalworkers
union provided the necessary information (EMF 2000: 17).
The report's conclusion is certainly a reflection of the enormous problems associated
with the development of a European wage bargaining policy among unions. Not only is
wage bargaining still an exclusively national task for unions (Blank 1997: 126), the
rules and norms by which they bargain vary considerably from one EU country to the
next (Europäische Kommission 1999). Lacking the recognition of elementary rights at
the supranational level such as the right to strike, European wage bargaining would
easily turn into "collective begging". For their part, national unions have refused to
cede the power to levy sanctions for non-compliance. Such are the conditions which
internationally oriented unionists must recognize and accept in seeking to develop
cross-border collaboration, which is clearly the reason why such policies - despite the
existence of the EMU - are still the exception rather than the rule.
For the IG Metall, wage bargaining policy as a European task is currently based on two
strategies. For one, the union is committed to the EMF policy of coordinating (but not
controlling) the dimensions of national bargaining. Secondly, as early as 1997, the IGM
initiated a program of regional cross-border partnerships designed to support the
exchange of information and union officials dealing with wage bargaining. In the
meantime, the union has taken this approach one step further by proposing that union
representatives from all countries participating in the exchange map wage bargaining
strategy together (Gollbach/Schulten 1999: 459). To be sure, such is not reality by a
long shot, even in the IGM district of Northrhein-Westfalia which has actively supported
the program and probably gone further in cementing cross-border cooperation than any
of the other IGM district offices (Schartau 1998). As Gollbach and Schulten have noted,
the exchange of information has been developed and standardized, but the exchange
of persons and the active participation of foreign union officials in actual wage
bargaining sessions inevitably encounters far greater difficulties, not the least of which
are language and an understanding of the bargaining rituals. Their summation of the
prospects of such cooperative structures seems realistic: "Before foreign unionists are
able to assume a more 'active' role, the participating unions will above all have to
strengthen their mutual 'relationships of trust'. Only then will it be possible to hold
controversial discussions over different wage bargaining strategies and work out union
differences in an open and solidaristic manner (Gollbach/Schulten 1999: 463).
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The IG Metall is not the only German union which has taken small, but concrete steps
toward a European coordination of wage bargaining strategies. As early as 1995, the
German construction union IG BAU initiated a research project on the foundations of
union cooperation on labor market issues in Europe (Lubanski 2000: 106). In March,
1999, the IG BAU signed an agreement with the Austrian and Swiss construction
unions on cross-border wage bargaining coordination. This was followed in June, 2000
by a similar agreement with unions from Belgium and Holland to concretize the "Basic
Declaration of Principles on Wage Bargaining in the European Building Industry" of the
European Federation of Building and Woodworking Industries (Euro-Tarifpolitik der
Bau- und Agrargewerkschaften 2000: 50; Zagelmeyer 2000: 14f.) For its part, the IG
BCE (mining and chemical union) has set its priorities in developing bilateral
partnerships and using these to build a stronger European Mine, Chemical and Energy
Workers Federation (Zagelmeyer 2000: 15).
These and other initiatives reflect a growing awareness among German unionists
regarding the importance of a European perspective in collective bargaining with
employers. The lack of more decisive action such as the delegation of bargaining rights
to the European-level sectoral union is not only reflective of a reluctance to relinquish
control and rights, it is also a realistic assessment of the fact that the European-level
union organizations would still be hard pressed to find a bargaining partner on the
employers' side willing and able to negotiate. Still, union officials need not wait idly for
such a bargaining partner to appear. In the meantime, the level and intensity of cross-
border collaboration and exchanges can be increased. Within the organization, efforts
should be mounted to strengthen the European perspective regarding collective
bargaining and to build a solid understanding of both the existing EU and the
accession countries. The cross-border opening of union structures and policy-making
will need to follow the disappearance of internal political and economic barriers in
Europe if the unions are to be able to commit themselves to an active involvement in
determining the EU's future.
d. German unions and European Works Councils
Over 500 enterprises operating at the European level have complied with the EWC-
Directive. Of those, ca. 115 are enterprises with headquarters in Germany. DGB
member unions have actively supported the creation and operation of EWCs in those
enterprises, with responsibility depending on the organizational jurisdiction within
Germany. Information provided by the unions indicates that activities on behalf of
EWCs is highly concentrated in two unions: The IG Metall and the IG Bergbau,
Chemie, Energie (IG BCE). Indeed, the website of the IG BAU replies to queries about
"European Works Councils" by ushering the user via links to these unions off to their
internet pages.
While responsibility for EWCs at union headquarters has been generally integrated
into departmental teams connected to works council matters, unions have for the most
part remained at arms length to the EWCs. In part, this is a result of limited resources
available for a more intensive support program, and in part it may be a realistic
assessment of the actual role played by EWCs. But at the same time, not all EWCs
have actively sought a close relationship to the unions. As such, EWCs do not figure
prominently in union strategy perspectives for Europe, and they are certainly not a key
element of any union revitalization strategies.
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e. Inter-regional trade union committees (IRTUC)
Inter-regional trade union committees are probably the least well-known organizational
expressions of cross-border trade union collaboration. And yet, there are over 35 such
committees in existence today and some of the oldest were founded over 20 years ago.
German unions are involved in thirteen of the committees along Germany's borders
within the EU and with Poland and the Czech Republic.
The work of most IRTUCs is generally unspectacular, but at the same time essential for
furthering the spirit of European cooperation. The founding of an IRTUC is a supportive
step toward establishing ongoing cross-border communication and understanding
among employees of two or more nationalities. Once functioning, IRTUCs devote their
energies to regional cross-border labor market and regional development issues. In
addition, issues such as codetermination in enterprises operating on both sides of the
border, social insurance problems of commuting employees, and environmental
problems receive their attention.
Despite their numbers and their cross-border regional structure, the IRTUCs have
never been regarded as a strategic instrument of European policy by the German trade
unions. Nor have the German unions drafted a strategic concept for the inclusion of
IRTUCs in a comprehensive plan for revitalization, despite the fact that such
organizational structures could prove to be a core element for the promotion of cross-
border union strategies in Europe. Concrete experiences made within IRTUCs could be
exchanged with other organizational units of a europeanization of union perspectives
such as EWCs and cross-border partnerships for collective bargaining (Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund 1996).
III. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has sought to present a general picture of the policy and organizational
restructuring tasks facing German unions in the selected strategy areas. But beyond
such a problem definition based on the particular challenges confronting unions in
each area, we have addressed union responses and initiatives, evaluating their impact
and potential as instruments of revitalization. Unions are actors. Their policies and
politics determine their effectiveness as subjects of change as well as their capacity to
react to the input of other actors. Unions are not merely objects of an inexorable
process, in which their decline is programmed and the "end game" (Streeck 2001) is
soon to commence.
"Searching to regain the initiative" is an attempt to describe the difficulties which unions
are having from the viewpoint of this understanding. There is much going on, a wide
range of projects and activities can be observed. But we can not confirm that there is
an upsurge of focused revitalization, nor is it true that the organized labor movement is
at a standstill. The question is, as we see it, how can all of these activities be laced
together in a coherent revitalization strategy. As such, we conclude that the
development and application of successful strategies in the face of today's challenges
will require a clear understanding of what unions represent and what role they need to
play in the 21st century.
The increasing complexity of this task is evidenced quite succinctly by the two
catchwords "globalization" and "atypical". Internationally, markets and multinational
enterprises have generally remained as much untouched by the regulatory instruments
of democratic governments as by the control measures powerful national labor
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movements once had at their disposal. At the same time, union foundations are being
undercut by extensive changes in the labor force. The "normal" worker is more difficult
to define, while the prevalence of so-called atypical workers is growing. What is more,
both catchwords refer to processes which are interlinked and as such, unions require a
comprehensive understanding and strategy approach to act effectively on both.
On this point, our paper has pointed to deficits in the German unions. Top-down
strategies alone are costly and hard to disseminate and anchor throughout the
organization. Innovative strategies at the local level have the advantage of the
organizational unity of competent problem analysis, project planning and project
implementation. But without the means and readiness to spread such experiences in
the interest of developing "best practice" scenarios throughout the organization, local
initiatives will degenerate to being an exercise in "re-inventing the wheel" anew. In an
organization marked by deficiencies in the evaluation of the potential of new
approaches, both the impetus for innovation and the learning capacity of the
organization will wither57. This applies equally to the individual member unions of the
DGB federation as well as to the relationship between the members and the federation.
Beyond this general problem of organizational learning, we attach special importance
to two dimensions of union revitalization which combine actions of separate strategy
areas: German unions need to both expand their field of strategic vision to the
European level and at the same time focus their vision on workplace strategies. In
regard to the latter, union revitalization turns on more active recruitment strategies
coupled with an organizational reform delegating more decision-making and
responsibility to the regional and local/workplace level. As employers initiate changes
in work environments, unions need to respond with initiatives of their own and of those
they (claim to) represent. Gaining the initiative will strengthen employee/union control
of the work environment and shape its fundamental character.
As for the other dimension, a broadening of the union strategy perspective from the
national to the European level is both unavoidable in the context of European
integration, it is above all initiative and presents an innovative opportunity if developed
prudently. To be sure, the German unions have contributed essentially as much (or as
little) as labor movements in other European Union countries, and a further
Europeanization of union organizations and politics can not be initiated unilaterally. But
to put the issue into focus as it concerns the German unions, the European perspective
has yet to be accepted by all union officials and activists, let alone has it been spread
to the membership. Strategies for union wage bargaining, union political action, union
mergers and organizational restructuring have at best only marginally integrated issues
with a European dimension. And yet, it is unavoidable that all such strategies, whether
for the protection of the sectoral contract, for combating unemployment or for
eliminating right extremism, must come up short as national approaches.
The German unions have a rich history of success and influence to call upon in finding
their road to revitalization. Justice and solidarity have always counted as their basic
goals and as the building blocks of their identity. But the unions are in danger of
betraying this heritage if they fail to redefine such goals in terms of new challenges, i.e.
at the European level and at the workplace. Will the unions grasp the initiative to this
57 An excellent example of both the development of innovative strategies with measurable
revitalization impact and the failure to communicate and anchor this experience throughout the
organization is given by Carsten Wirth in his study of the retail trade sector in Germany. (Wirth
1999)
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end? The historians of the Hans-Böckler-Circle gave their own answer to this question
1990 in reference to the problems which German unification was causing the unions.
"The German labor movement has always been able to adapt to new demands and
conditions only after experiencing a crisis." (Hans-Böckler-Kreis 1990: 590) No one,
however, is destined to repeat history.
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